ANALYSIS

OF

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS RESPECTING EGYPT,

BY

LORD TENTERDEN:

(SEPTEMBER 9, 1881, TO MAY 31, 1882).

WITH A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF EVENTS FROM 1840-1881:

AND A MAP.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1882.

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ANALYSIS

LORD TENTERDEN:

(September 9, 1881, to May 31, 1882).

WITH A

SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF EVENTS FROM 1840-81.

AND A MAP.

PREFACE.

THE reigning dynasty in Egypt was founded by Mehemet Ali, who was appointed Pasha in 1805. He subdued the Mamelukes in 1811, and organized an army and a fleet.

In 1824 he assisted the Porte against the Greeks; but after the battle of Navarino declared his independence, and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, invaded and conquered Syria. Eventually the Powers intervened, and the pretensions of Mehemet Ali were brought to a close by the Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, from which France was purposely excluded, for the pacification of the Levant.

By this Treaty, 15th July, 1840 (Annex A), and the separate Act annexed to it, the Sultan granted to Mehemet Ali, for himself and his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt. All the Treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire were to be applicable to Egypt, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire; but the Sultan agreed that, on condition of the regular payment of an annual Tribute, Mehemet Ali and his descendants should collect, within the provinces the administration of which was confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established, and should defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration.

Mehemet Ali having failed to comply with one of the conditions of the Treaty with regard to the evacuation of Syria, his submission was secured by the bombardment and capture of St. Jean d'Acre by the British fleet on the 3rd November, 1840, and in 1841 the relations between the Porte and Egypt were further defined by the Firman of the 1st June, 1841, by which the Tribute was fixed at 363,3651., the army was not to exceed 18,000 men, &c.

The route by Southampton, Suez, and Bombay was opened in 1830; by Marseilles, in 1837; and for the quick conveyance of the mails, via Trieste and Suez, on the proposal of Lieutenant Waghorn, the original overland route, in 1845; the railway from Alexandria to Suez in 1858.

In 1866 Ismail, Mehemet Ali's grandson, obtained by Firman the addition of the Pashalics of Souakim and Massourah, and the modification of the Order of Succession, so that it should pass from father to son instead of to the eldest male, according to the usual Turkish practice, in consideration of the Tribute being raised to 685,3081.

In 1867, 1869, 1872, and 1873 further Firmans extended the privileges and authority of the Viceroy in regard to Commercial Treaties, foreign loans, levy of troops, right to build ships of war, except iron-clads, &c.

In January 1876 the new Tribunals were opened during the Ministry of Nubar Pasha, by which the system of Consular jurisdiction, under the Turkish Capitulations, was superseded in civil cases and a system of foreign Judges established for a period of five years, since extended for two years longer.

The Suez Canal was opened 17th November, 1869. The shares of the Khedive were bought for 4,000,000l. in November 1875. The Khedive pays 198,829l. annually

as interest till 1895.

The first Egyptian loan was in 1862. Eight other loans followed; the last in 1873; all the available revenues were thus pledged to various loans, and a financial

collapse was imminent.

In October 1875 the Khedive applied for financial advice, and Mr. Cave was sent, accompanied by Colonel Stokes. The following year the Khedive decided on introducing European supervision as a means of restoring his credit. The Duc Decazes suggested the establishment of an International Commission similar to that in Tunis. Lord Derby objected to this, but Mr. Rivers Wilson was allowed to go to Egypt to see whether he would be willing to accept employment, which led to no result, and M. Villet was similarly sent out by the French Government.

Eventually a Commission of the Public Debt was constituted, upon which an Austrian, Italian, and Frenchman, M. de Blignières, were appointed the 22nd May,

As the Egyptian Government were unable to induce Lord Derby to name a Commissioner officially, the Khedive earnestly requested that the British Government would assist him to procure officials on his own account. Mr. Rogers, his Agent, was accordingly introduced to the Treasury and Board of Trade, and partly by this means the services of several gentlemen were obtained for the Egyptian Departments of

Finance, Customs, and Commerce.

In May 1876 the Khedive issued a Decree, to which the bondholders strongly objected, and in October Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert went out to Egypt on their behalf. Their mission resulted in the addition of Captain Baring to the Debt Commission, 2nd March, 1877, but not on the nomination or responsibility of the English Government, and in the constitution of the Control, by the consent of the French Government to name a Controller-General of Expenditure. Lord Derby continued to refuse, and M. Romaine was appointed, on the nomination of Mr. Goschen, as Controller-General of Receipts. The management of the Railways and Port of Alexandria was, as part of the same arrangement, placed under a Board, composed of English, French, and Egyptian members.

The Tribunals, having come into operation, were appealed to by the Khedive's creditors, and the German Government insisted on their Judgments being executed,

This led to the Commission of Inquiry, composed of M. de Lesseps (who, however, March 1878. took no active part), Riaz Pasha, Mr. Rivers Wilson, and the four Commissioners of the Public Debt, who reported, 19th August, 1878, strongly condemning the existing system of absolute power. Then came the European Ministry. Nubar Pasha, President; Mr. Rivers Wilson, Finance; Riaz Pasha, Interior; M. de Blignières, Public Works, &c.

On the 26th October the Khedive raised a loan of 8,500,000l., secured on the estates ceded by the Khedive's family—the Domains Loan—to be administered by English, French, and Egyptian Commissioners, the English and French being allowed to accept office on the condition that they should not be dismissed without the consent

of their respective Governments.

On the 18th February, 1879, the military riot at Cairo occurred, the European

Ministers were dismissed, and Riaz Pasha assumed office.

On the 26th June Ismaïl Pasha was deposed by an Imperial Iradé, and Tewfik

Pasha succeeded, under a new Firman (Annex B).

When the English and French Ministers were admitted to the Egyptian Cabinet, the appointment of the Controllers was suspended, with the condition that it should be

revived if those Ministers were dismissed.

On becoming Khedive, Tewfik Pasha retained a native Ministry, together with Chérif Pasha as President of the Council, who informed the French and English Agents that if the Governments of France and England should nominate Controllers-General under the Decree of November 1876, His Highness would also agree to appoint them, but their functions should be limited to investigation and verification, and they should not be invested with administrative or executive powers, and Lord Salisbury accepted this offer.

On the 6th August Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Lascelles:-

For the present, at least, it is understood that no direct administrative authority shall be exercised by the Controllers, but that in place of it a great extension shall be given to their functions of inspection and supervision, and that they shall be invested with all the powers necessary to enable them to exercise those functions with effect.

Major Baring and M. de Blignières were appointed Controllers accordingly on the

On the 31st March, 1880, the Commission of Liquidation was appointed to 4th September. examine into and report on the Egyptian Debt, which was in a state of the greatest confusion. The Commission consisted of Sir C. Rivers Wilson, the four Debt Commissioners, the Secretary of the Control, and the German Consul at Cairo, and framed a law for the settlement of the Debt, which was accepted by the Powers and made obligatory on the Tribunals ("Egypt No. 4, 1880").

The principle adopted was to fund the floating debt, to consolidate the funded debts, to reduce the rate of interest which was payable on the debts, and to allocate

fixed revenues for their discharge, as follows:-

"Privileged:—Capital, 22,629,800l.; rate of interest, 5 per cent. Charge: annuity of 1,187,403l., to redeem capital by 1941. Security: railways and telegraphs, port of

"Unified:—Capital, 58,043,236l.; rate of interest, 4 per cent. Charge: Alexandria. 2,321,7291. Security: revenues of four provinces, customs, including tobacco, and general charge on Treasury. This security is subject to a first charge in favour of

the Privileged Debt."

The Budget prepared by the Commissioners estimated the revenue applicable for administrative purposes at 5,110,046l., and the administrative expenditure, including the Tribute, Administrative Reserve Fund, and interest on Suez Canal shares (198,829l.), &c., at 5,023,475l.

The total estimated revenue, including the revenues mortgaged to the Debt, was

put at 8,576,023l. for 1880 and 1881, and 8,627,304l. for subsequent year.

The total estimated expenditure, including the charge for the Privileged and Unified Debts, 8,532,6071.

Provision was also made for the debts of the Daïras Sanieh and Khassa; interest

at 4 per cent., to be raised to 5 per cent. if income of the estates permit.

The Domains were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission of Liquidation, but in April 1880 a convention between the Egyptian Government and the houses of Rothschild added the revenues of the Province of Keneh to the existing guarantees for 5 per cent. on that Loan. The other guarantees are the estates themselves and the general revenues of Egypt. The loan was for 8,500,000l.

On the 18th August, 1879, Chérif Pasha resigned, the Khedive disagreeing with him as to the extent to which the Constitution should be changed. The Khedive told Sir E. Malet he hoped that in time the country would become fitted for Parliamentary institutions, and therefore he proposed to make no change with regard to the Chamber of Delegates, which might eventually become a really representative body, but that at present liberal institutions and popular representation were utterly

Riaz Pasha then again became Prime Minister, and the Administration proceeded unsuited to the country. tranquilly until the 1st February, 1881, when there was a second military riot. The officers of the 1st Regiment broke into the Ministry of War and released several officers of that regiment, whom the Minister of War had arrested. The Khedive saying that he had no means of resistance, consented to the Ministers' dismissal. In April a Commission was appointed to inquire into the grievances of the army. The Moslem members combined against the new Minister of War, and Arabi Bey declared that he would not yield unconditional obedience to him.

For a fuller account of the history of the Administration of Egypt, 1840-81, see

my Summary of the 10th October, 1881.

ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

" Egypt No. 3 (1882)." (September 9 to November 4, 1881.)

The papers presented to Parliament this year commence with a Report of a third military riot ("Egypt No. 3, 1882," p. 1), which took place on the 9th September,

1881, headed by Arabi Bey. The Colonels demanded the dismissal of the Ministry, a Constitution, and the increase of the army. The Khedive assented to the dismissal of the Ministry, and summoned Chérif Pasha. He also told Mr. Cookson and the French Agent that he had telegraphed to Constantinople what had occurred, and had asked that twenty battalions of Turkish troops might be sent to restore order. Chérif Pasha at first demurred to taking office as the Minister of a military revolution, but agreed to do so on the 14th, on being requested by the Notables, a number of whom had been summoned to Cairo by Arabi Bey, and on the assurance that the army would submit to his authority.

At an interview with Mr. Adams, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, on the 11th September (p. 6), M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire said that his policy with reference to Egypt was well known, and had never varied; it was summed up in the absolute necessity, as in the past, so in the future, of perfect frankness between the two Govern-

ments, and joint action on every occasion.

This policy, he considered, had been the salvation of Egypt; and his Excellency observed that he trusted tranquillity was now really restored, and he was of opinion that it would be necessary to wait a little, and not act with precipitation, but watch what turn matters would take. He was, however, ready to concert, at the proper moment, as to any measures which it might be advisable for the two Governments to adopt; and he referred to the establishment of a joint Anglo-French military control in Egypt.

"His Excellency also expressed himself very strongly against Turkish troops

being sent to Egypt at this moment.

"He felt that such a step would be giving to the Sultan a greater hold upon that country; and he feared that the troops, if once landed, would be likely to remain there permanently. He was of opinion that such a measure should only be taken by the Sultan at the joint request of England and France."

Lord Granville said (p. 7) that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would not be desirable that any active measures of repression should be taken by the Sultan until, at all events, the necessity for them had been clearly demonstrated, and

the method to be adopted had been discussed and agreed upon.

But they saw no objection to the Sultan, if His Majesty should be so disposed, sending, with the consent of England and France, a Turkish General to Egypt to

support the Khedive's authority, and aid His Highness with his advice.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire said (p. 8) that it was true that the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt was acknowledged by France and England; but he was opposed to calling upon the Sultan to exercise his powers as Suzerain unless it were absolutely necessary, and he feared that even the dispatch of a Turkish General to Egypt might lead to further steps, resulting, perhaps, in a permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops. He much preferred the idea he had already broached to Lord Lyons, that of a joint Military Control, consisting of a French and an English General, who, he thought, would be able to introduce order and discipline into the Egyptian army.

As this idea was not pursued to any practical issue, it is unnecessary to

refer to it further.

On the 14th September Lord Dufferin was instructed to advise the Porte not to take any hasty action, but, like Her Majesty's Government, to use calming and

pacifying language.

On the 15th Lord Dufferin informed the Sultan that His Majesty might rest assured that England had no other desire than to maintain undisturbed the actual status quo, which amply secured to us all we wanted, namely, the freedom of the Isthmus of Suez, and reasonably good government for the Egyptian people. Far from wishing to put upon His Majesty's sovereign rights in Egypt any restraint beyond those already defined in international arrangements, we desired, on the contrary, to countenance and maintain them in the interests of the existing Règlement, and would certainly deprecate any change, which would probably prove as disadvantageous to us as to him.

This language was entirely approved.

On the 18th Lord Dufferin was directed, in case the Sultan should propose to send a Turkish General to Cairo, with a view to assist in the re-establishment of

order, to endeavour to dissuade His Majesty from adopting this course.

On the 21st Lord Granville recorded the communication by the French Ambassador, on the 14th, of a despatch condemning, in the strongest terms, the dispatch either of a Turkish General or of Turkish troops.

M. Challemel-Lacour did not leave a copy of the despatch, but stated that, as the situation in Egypt had become less strained since it was written, he considered it

best to make only a verbal communication of its contents.

In the programme for his new Ministry, published by Chérif Pasha on the 16th, and adopted by the Khedive, Chérif Pasha dwelt on the benefits which the country had received from the institution of the joint Control, and declared his intention to maintain it unaltered.

On the 20th September the Sultan intimated to M. Tissot, then French Ambassador at Constantinople, that he had no present intention of sending troops to Egypt, and that, in any event, he would maintain the status quo; but that he considered, in view of Turkey's enormous interests both in Egypt and in the Hedjaz, that he had a perfect right to dispatch an emissary with his compliments and advice to the Khedive, and that this he intended to do, though the person

would not have the official character of a Commissioner.

On the 30th September Lord Granville told the French Chargé d'Affaires that Her Majesty's Government entertained nearly the same objections to the occupation of Egypt by a Turkish force in the present circumstances as did the French Government. They thought that it would be a great evil. But the mission of a Turkish General to Egypt at the time of the crisis was a different matter. Although at first sight it did not seem probable, yet he had been assured by most competent persons in this country and in Egypt that the presence of a Turkish General, supported only by the cordial approval of England and France, would have had the effect of controlling, and even, in case of need, of disbanding, the Egyptian army. The abdication of the late Khedive, a man of strong will, without the pressure of material force, was quoted as a case in point. "Since then the urgency of the crisis having been relieved, and the objections of the French Government having been made known, Lord Dufferin had pressed the Sultan to take no action in the matter."

The Sultan having decided to send a Commissioner, Lord Dufferin was instructed (p. 24) to express the surprise and regret of Her Majesty's Government at the decision at which His Majesty had arrived, and to inquire with what object and in what capacity he was sent, and also to insist that no attempt should be made to

interfere with the internal administration of the country.

On the 13th September Sir E. Malet (p. 24) had an interview with the Sultan at Constantinople, where he had called on his way back to his post from leave of absence. The following is the report of the interview:—

"On my asking His Majesty whether he proposed to take any steps in answer to the application for assistance which was reported to have been made by the Khedive, he replied that he was not, as yet, in possession of sufficient details with regard to the origin and nature of the movement to be able to determine what ought to be done. He observed that the military put forward three demands: (1) the dismissal of the Ministry; (2) a Constitution; and (3) an increase of the army. With regard to the first point, His Majesty remarked that the fall of Ministries before the popular expression of the feeling of the country was not an unusual event; that in this case that popular feeling had apparently found its mouthpiece in the army; that although it was to be regretted, he did not consider the first point as one to be withstood.

"But the second point, His Majesty said, was one which he could not concede; it was not possible for him to allow a Constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it from the

"On the third point, he observed that the strength of an army depended upon the necessities of a country; that he was not sufficiently informed about Egypt to be able to say off-hand that the present

strength of its army was adequate, though his impression was in that direction.

"I said that naturally the situation in Egypt had given rise to my being consulted by Her Majesty's Government as to the course to be pursued there in case the insubordination of the military should continue, and that I had expressed the view that the remedy lay with His Majesty as Suzerain of the Khedive; that I had expressed this opinion because it seemed to me to be the only one which could be in harmony with the general policy of England towards Egypt, which was distinctly not one of aggression; that our only object was to maintain tranquillity and good government in the country which was our highway to India; that therefore, if armed repression should unfortunately become necessary, it seemed to me that it ought to be employed by the Sovereign Power. I added that I had received no instructions on the subject from your Lordship, as previous to my departure from England the news from Egypt had led me to believe that no military movement was imminent, and that I had expected to be able to reach my post and to report upon the state of affairs before any distinct instructions could become necessary.

"His Majesty expressed much satisfaction at the views which I had expressed. He said that he perfectly understood the interests of England, and that he felt sure that, in any measures which he might be compelled to take, he should meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, as he

desired to act in understanding with them."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to Lord Dufferin on the 4th October [971]

(p. 32) that the two functionaries who had been sent to Egypt were intended to convey to the Viceroy the Sultan's approval, to indicate his desire to maintain the existing state of things, and to morally strengthen his position.

The English and French Governments requested the Porte (p. 33) to shorten the

stay of the Envoys as much as possible.

Lord Granville, at the same time, told Musurus Pasha (p. 33) that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of acting in cordial co-operation with France on Egyptian questions. Whatever rumours or impressions might exist, they had no desire to take any steps towards an English occupation or annexation of the country; still less did they wish to see it occupied or annexed by any other Power. They were anxious to maintain the present status quo, and to uphold the Sultan's rights; but they should object to any attempt to extend those rights, or to use them for the purpose of diminishing the autonomy of Egypt, and interfering in its internal administration.

The Khedive was advised by the English and French Governments to receive the expected Turkish Envoys with all the honours due to their rank, but to firmly oppose

any interference on their part in the internal administration of Egypt.

The Turkish Envoys arrived (p. 37) on the 6th October, Arabi Bey having left

Cairo with his regiment for El Ouady.

On the 10th October Sir E. Malet was informed that an English and French ship of war would proceed to Alexandria.

On the 11th (p. 51) the Sultan sent a message to Lord Dufferin protesting against

the English and French Governments sending the iron-clads.

In reply to a similar inquiry from Chérif Pasha, Sir E. Malet was told (p. 51) that the two Governments had determined to send a British ship and a French ship to Alexandria, to be stationed at that port as refuges in case of disturbances, and in order to prevent any panic arising amongst the foreign population.

On the 14th Lord Granville told Musurus Pasha that so long as the presence of the Commissioners in Egypt was an evidence of an abnormal state of affairs, the presence of the ships at Alexandria could only be regarded in the light of a proper and

necessary precaution for the safety of British residents.

The Turkish Envoys left Cairo on the 18th October, and the English and French

ships on the 20th.

The next published despatch in order of date, and which concludes this series ("Egypt No. 3, 1882") is that addressed to Sir E. Malet on the 4th November, which has already been presented to Parliament separately as "Egypt No. 1 (1882)."

The following are some of the principal passages:-

"The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879.

"In our belief the prosperity of Egypt, like that of every country, depends upon the progress and

well-being of the people.

"We have, therefore, on all occasions, pressed upon the Government of the Khedive the adoption of such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one of ease and security. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support, and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General.

"One measure of reform among others remains to be accomplished, which we consider to be even more necessary than those above enumerated—the reform of justice as it is administered to the

natives. "The proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well-being of all nations, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are convinced that until it is established no Ministry will enjoy the full confidence of the country, or can be regarded as fitting

guardians of the State.

"It would seem hardly necessary to enlarge upon our desire to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence which has been secured to her by the Sultan's Firmans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or to tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth. It would not be difficult, if it were necessary, to show by reference to recent events that this Government should be safe from the suspicions which, as you inform me, exist in Egypt with regard to our intentions on this head. On the other hand, the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, a valuable safeguard against foreign intervention. Were it to be broken, Egypt might at no very distant future find herself exposed to danger from rival ambitions. It is therefore our aim to maintain this tie as it at present exists.

"The only circumstance which could force us to depart from the course of conduct which I have above indicated would be the occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy. We look to the Khedive, and to Chérif Pasha, and to the good sense of the Egyptian people, to prevent such a catastrophe, and they, on their part, may rest assured that, so long as Egypt continues in the path of tranquil and legitimate progress, it will be the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to contribute to so happy a result."

"Egypt No. 5 (1882)." (November 5, 1881, to February 6, 1882.)

The first important despatches in the series "Egypt No. 5 (1882)," p. 7, are two despatches from M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, communicated on the 12th November, describing the interests of France and England. The following are the most striking passages (p. 10):--

"One may therefore say that France and England, while having interests of a very different description in Egypt, yet have equal interests there; and thence arises the imperious need there is

for the two countries to agree for the defence of these interests.

"These truths, which must strike every one, have been evidenced for some years in the unexpected recovery of the Egyptian finances, to which the two Powers have contributed in an equal degree. The Anglo-French Controllers-General have restored credit and regenerated a confidence which promises for an almost ruined country more and more widely extended prosperity. For the European creditors of Egypt this is an unlooked-for stroke of fortune; these creditors are for the most part English and French; but other nations had also subscribed to the loans of the ex-Khedive; and consequently it is not England and France alone who profit by these excellent results.

"These important and decisive considerations should serve to indicate to the Agents of France and England the line of conduct to be followed in their relations with each other and with the Khedivial Government. Well understood and well applied, these considerations should prevent many of the disputes and calm much of the irritation which may arise in the incidents and occurrences of each day. The object at which the Agents of the two countries should aim is to always maintain the balance equal, and to make every necessary sacrifice for the sake of concord, which is indis-

pensable. "In all the services which are shared by the English and French there should be an endeavour to have the participation as identic as possible; and when, in the nature of things, that cannot be, equitable compensation should at least re-establish the balance. There should be no rivalry; there should only be sympathetic concurrence, and an emulation which brings people together instead of separating them."

At the fêtes of the Kourban Baïram (p. 12) there were military disturbances at

Cairo, where Arabi Bey, Abdul al Bey, and other Colonels were assembled.

On the 3rd December Lord Granville told General Menabrea (p. 16) that the declaration of policy made in the despatch of the 4th November was perfectly genuine, and that it was our firm intention to abide by it unless the contingency which was mentioned in the despatch itself—that of the occurrence of a state of anarchy in Egypt—should, unhappily, create the necessity for a different course.

The Memorandum prepared by the Controllers (p. 17) in view of a proposal to increase the army showed that the expenditure could only be met by economies or increased taxation, as the surplus of the assigned revenue could only be legally used

for the reduction of the debt.

On the 15th December (p. 21) M. Gambetta, who had acceded to office as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke to Lord Lyons on the state of affairs in Egypt. He said that—

"In this state of things he thought that it would be prudent for the French and English Governments to consult with each other on the course to be taken by them in common in the face of certain not improbable events.

"The first and most important thing was that the two Governments should not only be perfectly united, but should make their union unmistakably apparent, both to their friends and their adversaries in

Egypt.

"As regarded the actual posture of affairs in Egypt, M. Gambetta considered it to be extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and to infuse into him firmness and energy. On the other hand, the enemies of the present system, the adherents of Ismail Pasha and Halim Pasha, and the Egyptians generally, should be made to understand that France and England, by whose influence Tewfik had been placed on the throne, would not acquiesce in his being deposed from it.

"It would also, M. Gambetta conceived, be advisable to cut short intrigues at Constantinople, and to make the Porte feel that any undue interference on its part would not be tolerated. Any interposition on the part of the Porte M. Gambetta declared emphatically to be, in his opinion, wholly

inadmissible."

On the 17th December Sir E. Malet reported (p. 22) that the Minister of War had demanded 280,000l. increase on the Budget. The Controllers had succeeded in reducing the demand to 120,000l.

Sir E. Malet added that it was not the intention of the Government to submit the Budget to the Chamber of Notables that was about to assemble. Arabi Bey was

in Cairo, and intended to remain until the opening of the Chamber, and probably longer, and it was questionable how long Chérif Pasha would be able or willing to remain at the head of the Government if Arabi Bey maintained the attitude of arbiter of the destinies of the country.

On the 19th Lord Granville instructed Lord Lyons to tell M. Gambetta that Her Majesty's Government thought that it was desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding, but that it required careful consideration what

steps should be taken in case of disorder again reappearing.

On the 24th (p. 24) M. Gambetta said to Lord Lyons that as the Session of the Chamber of Notables, which was on the eve of being opened, produced a considerable change in the political situation of Egypt, it would afford France and England a not unsuitable opportunity for demonstrating, on the one hand, their own absolute union; and, on the other hand, for encouraging Tewfik Pasha.

With these objects, M. Gambetta suggested, as a first and immediate step, that the two Governments should instruct their Representatives at Cairo to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper

authority.

This step might, M. Gambetta thought, be taken in such a way by the two Representatives as to make it a distinct manifestation of union between France and England, so as to strengthen the position of Tewfik Pasha, and as to discourage the promoters of disorders.

On the 26th December the Chamber of Notables was opened by the Khedive,

Sultan Pasha having been appointed by Decree to be President.

Arabi Bey was appointed on the 5th January Under-Secretary for War.

On the 6th January Lord Granville agreed with M. Gambetta on the dual note to be addressed jointly to the English and French Agents at Cairo, with the reservation that Her Majesty's Government must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary:-

"You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of England and France to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt.

"The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a

further exchange of views.

"I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to Tewfik Pasha, after concerting with M. Sienkiewicz, who has been instructed to make simultaneously with you an identic declaration, that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and future the good order and general posperity in Egypt in which England and France are equally interested.

"The two Governments being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the

destinies of Egypt and its people."

This despatch has been already presented to Parliament: "Egypt No. 2 (1882)." On the 9th January Lord Granville told Musurus Pasha that there was no change in our views as to the position of the Sultan in regard to Egypt and its Ruler, and that it was not true, as had been reported in the newspapers, that the French Government had proposed to us, or that we had agreed, to promise the Khedive material support.

On the 10th Sir E. Malet telegraphed that the new Organic Law of the Chamber divided the Budget into two sections, one dealing with the revenues assigned to the Public Debt, the other with the revenues unassigned, and the Chamber insisted on

the right of voting the latter.

Chérif Pasha and the Controllers considered that if the Chamber acquired this

right the Council, and therefore the Controllers, lost their hold on the finances.

The opinion of the French Government having been asked, M. Gambetta said that it behoved France and England to be very firm, lest any appearance of vacillation on their part should encourage the pretensions of the Notables to lay their hands on the Budget; and he argued that their touching the Budget must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the arrangement made by the Liquidation Commission, to the

subversion of the French and English Control, and to the ruin of the Egyptian finances (p. 45).

Lord Granville concurred that the proposal of the Notables in regard to voting that portion of the Budget which dealt with the unassigned resources and the expenses of administration, at all events in its present shape, could not be agreed to, although

there might be points worthy of consideration hereafter.

Sir E. Malet was therefore (January 16) instructed to join his French colleague in supporting Chérif Pasha in his opposition to the demand of the Chamber in this respect (p. 48).

He, however, reported by telegraph, January 20:-

"The Chamber will almost certainly vote the Counter-project of Law, which places the administrative and financial power in its hands, and amounts to government by Convention.

"If an attempt be made to dismiss the Chamber, it will probably demand a new Ministry, though it has no right to do so. The new Ministry must accept the Counter-project of the Chamber for the Organic Law, and the authority of Chérif will be disputed if it is sought to maintain him.

"Armed intervention will become a necessity if we adhere to the refusal to allow the Budget to be voted by the Chamber, and we cannot do otherwise, as it forms only a part of a complete scheme of revolution. Yet all Governments are interested in preventing the necessity of intervention, which, if undertaken by the two Powers alone, would probably lead to serious disaster here between the time that it was decided upon and the subjection of the country.

"I think that the Chamber would listen to reason if the Great Powers were to refuse to consent to the transfer of power to the Chamber; but to state that, while otherwise maintaining the status quo, they will guarantee a constitution compatible with international engagements, and will take steps to come to an agreement on the subject. I think that this is the only way out of a situation which is

rapidly leading both us and the Egyptians to extremities.

"The united Powers will be listened to, but not England and France alone, because they think that we are actuated by selfish motives, and that the other Powers will not allow us to deal with the Egyptian question alone. They may be in error, but the time for action might come before they are

It is necessary to notice these occurrences in some detail, as this was the beginning of the revolution which has destroyed the Khedive's authority and left it in the hands of Arabi Pasha and the army, notwithstanding that the President of the Chamber announced at the outset that "the Chamber was firmly resolved never to have recourse to the aid of the military in the prosecution of its policy" (p. 55).

Other correspondence respecting the demand of the Notables for the control of

the Budget will be found at pp. 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 64, 65, 68, 71, and 72.

On the 25th January the French Ambassador told Lord Granville that M. Gambetta was of opinion that it was desirable, in view of the probable crisis in Egypt, that the English and French Governments should come to an understanding as to the course

which they should pursue.

Any Turkish intervention was, in M. Gambetta's opinion, the worst possible solution. M. Gambetta's attention had been called to a plan which had appeared in the press of calling in the co-operation of Europe. M. Gambetta remarked that the position of England in Egypt, in consequence of her Indian possessions, was unique. That of France, owing to her being a great African Power, and to other circumstances, was of the greatest importance. Besides this normal position of the two Powers, arrangements had been entered into by Egypt which had been acquiesced in by the European Powers generally, and it would be most disadvantageous to Egypt and to the two Powers that these arrangements should be weakened.

Lord Granville concurred that evidence of agreement between the two Governments should be given, and proposed that they should address an answer in similar terms to the communication which had been received from the Porte (p. 45) respecting the dual note. He accordingly forwarded a draft for the concurrence of

the French Government:-

"Her Majesty's Government cannot admit the justice of the objections raised by Assim Pasha to the course taken by them in conjunction with France, either as regards the manner in which the Declaration was forwarded, or as to the extent to which their action was called for by the situation of affairs in Egypt.

"I explained to Musurus Pasha at the time that it did not imply any doubt on the part of Her

Majesty's Government as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt.

"The policy of Her Majesty's Government has undergone no change since the date of my despatch to Sir E. Malet of the 4th November, and they are as anxious as they were then for the progress and well-being of Egypt, for the continuance of the sovereignty of the Porte over it, and for the maintenance of the liberties and administrative independence secured to it by the Sultan's Firmans.

"They desire to promote the financial and material improvement of the country, and the introduction of necessary reforms in the various branches of the Administration; but they have no ambitious designs, and no wish to secure for themselves an exclusive influence, nor would they willingly see such

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an influence in the hands of any other single Power. They have every reason to believe that the Government of France holds similar views, and is equally free from any designs of self-aggrandize-

"But Her Majesty's Government cannot be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of the efforts which have been successfully made during the last few years to improve the condition of the country, and it was with a view of warding off such a catastrophe that they thought it advisable, in conjunction with the French Government, to forward, through their respective Agents, a Declaration which should have the effect of showing the complete accord of

the two Governments in carrying out the policy which I have described.

"The course of events in Egypt during the last few months tended to show that the recent movement, though it may have beneficial effects if kept within proper limits, might, if pushed too far, lead to a limitation of the Khedive's authority, as existing in virtue of the Firmans granted by the Sultans and communicated to the Powers, and might also result in an interference with those international arrangements in which England and France are primarily interested by reason of their situation, and specially interested in virtue of the Decrees of the Khedive, negotiated by and with them alone, by which they were invited to reorganize the administration of the finances in Egypt, but to which the other Powers of Europe have also become parties.

"Proposals have been made, even before the dual note was presented, which proved that there

were grounds for this apprehension" (p. 67).

On the 26th January the French Ministry resigned, but M. Gambetta remained

some days at the Foreign Office.

On the 30th he told Lord Lyons that he concurred in the draft generally, though he commented on some of the paragraphs (p. 73), and suggested some alterations (p. 74) which Lord Granville adopted (p. 76).

On the 30th the following despatch was addressed to Lord Lyons:-

"I have sent to your Excellency in my despatch of the 25th instant the substance of a conversation which I had on the evening of the 24th instant with M. Challemel-Lacour respecting M. Gambetta's views on Egyptian affairs. I expressed no opinion in reply at the time, but promised to renew the conversation.

"I had already intimated to your Excellency that you would probably receive instructions to inform the French Government how desirable it appeared that there should be a perfectly frank and

confidential interchange of opinions on this subject.

"Her Majesty's Government believe that, in the present circumstances, it is very important that the union of England and France should be clearly apparent, and that an agreement should be come to as to the course which should be adopted in view of contingencies which may at any moment become imminent.

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain the rights of the Sovereign and vassal as now established between the Sultan and the Khedive, to secure the fulfilment of international engagements, and to protect the development of institutions within this limit. They believe that the French Government share these views. The question remains—If in Egypt a state of disorder should occur which would be incompatible with this policy, what measures should be taken to meet the difficulty?

"M. Gambetta appears, in his letter to M. Challemel-Lacour, to have made no specific suggestions on this head, but to have stated objections to two alternatives which, among others, have been the subject of public speculation, in case of the necessity arising of some sort of intervention in Egypt.

"It is to be regretted, but it appears to Her Majesty's Government to be apparent, that if such a contingency unfortunately occurred there are objections to every possible course. The question remains

-which of them offers the least inconvenience?

"Her Majesty's Government do not apprehend, although it is possible, that there is much practical danger of such an outbreak as would cause anarchy, and be fatal to the lives and property of Europeans. The probable danger is that the Notables, supported by the Egyptian army, influenced by a disbelief in the real union of England and France, encouraged by the idea of the support they might obtain from other European Powers and from Turkey, may establish a Government, of which the policy would be inconsistent with the position of the Khedive as guaranteed by the Firmans of the Porte, and with the international engagements of Egypt both towards England and France, and towards other European Powers.

"Her Majesty's Government have a strong objection to the occupation by themselves of Egypt. It would create opposition in Egypt and in Turkey; it would excite the suspicion and jealousy of other European Powers, who would, Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe, make counterdemonstrations on their own part which might possibly lead to very serious complications, and it would throw upon them the responsibility of governing a country inhabited by Orientals under very adverse

circumstances.

"They believe that such an occupation would be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole

occupation of Egypt by the French would be to this country.

"They have carefully considered the question of a joint occupation by England and France, and they have come to the conclusion that, although some of the objections above stated might be lessened

others would be very seriously aggravated by such a course.

"With regard to Turkish occupation, Her Majesty's Government agree that it would be a great evil, but they are not convinced that it would entail political dangers so great as those attending the other alternatives which have been mentioned above. If a temporary occupation could be arranged with the full consent and under the control of England and of France, and with proper guarantees and conditions, such a mode of using force might be the least objectionable of those which have yet been

"But as regards the immediate intervention of force, I have already stated my doubts as to the probability of a necessity for a decision at once arising. That what is urgent is to consider what steps can best be adopted to prevent or to deal with the second contingency which I have mentioned, namely, a Government in Egypt with a policy which is inadmissible for the acceptance of England and France.

"The most important point is, that the union of the two countries should be both real and

apparent.

"M. Gambetta entertains objections to any further admission of the other European Powers to interference in Egyptian affairs. Her Majesty's Government agree that England and France have an exceptional position in that country owing to actual circumstances and to international agreements, and they also believe that inconvenience might arise from many Powers being called upon to join in any administrative functions, but they would submit, for the consideration of the French Government, whether it would not be desirable to enter into some communication with the other Powers as to the most desirable mode of dealing with a state of things which appears likely to interfere with the Firmans of the Sultan and the international engagements of Egypt."

On the 31st M. de Freycinet was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the 3rd February he told Lord Lyons that, having been only a few days in office, he was not so thoroughly acquainted with the state of Egypt as to be able to offer any definite suggestions.

On two points, however, he would not, he said, hesitate to express, in general

terms, his present views.

He was much disinclined to any armed intervention in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either separately.

He was also strongly opposed to any intervention on the part of the Porte

(p. 81).

On the 1st February, Chérif Pasha told Sir E. Malet that he expected the Chamber would demand his compliance or resignation, and that he must resign to avoid danger to the Khedive.

On the same day one of the Ministers told Sir E. Malet that "the only issue from the situation now is the immediate dispatch to Egypt of a Commission from the

Porte, to be followed as soon as possible by a Turkish force.

"He says that armed intervention on our part could neither be threatened nor effected without the most serious danger to the European population, and a resistance which would lead to prolonged bloodshed.

"He thinks that by acting with tact, and accepting any Ministry the Chamber asks for, we can tide over the moment without public disturbance; but he is of opinion that as the army has again exercised dictatorship, there is no hope for the future, unless it be rendered powerless by force.

"The matter is urgent, and demands immediate attention."

On the 2nd the Khedive summoned the English and French Agents to the Palace, and said that a deputation of the Chamber insisted on a change of Ministry, and having no force to resist he had yielded. The new Ministry was appointed on the 5th. Mahmoud Pasha Sami, hitherto Secretary for War, became Prime Minister, and Araby Bey was promoted to be Secretary for War.

M. de Freycinet asked Lord Lyons on the 3rd what meaning was to be attached to the reservation which Her Majesty's Government had made when they assented to

the draft Declaration to the Khedive of Egypt proposed by M. Gambetta.

Lord Lyons replied:-

"I presumed that Her Majesty's Government were to be understood as reserving to themselves, as a matter of course, the right to determine whether action in Egypt was necessary, and as specially guarding themselves against being supposed to have pledged themselves, by accepting the draft, to any particular mode of action, if action should, in fact, be found by them to be necessary.

"M. de Freycinet said this was the sense in which he himself understood the reservation, but that it had been argued that Her Majesty's Government had committed themselves to action in principle, and

had only declined to commit themselves beforehand to any particular mode of action.

"Your Lordship will recollect that the wording was as follows: 'with the reservation that they must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary."

Lord Lyons' language was approved (p. 84).

On the 6th February Her Majesty's Government proposed that France and England should communicate with the other Powers, and should ascertain whether they would be willing to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the affairs of Egypt on the basis of the maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign, of the liberties of the Egyptian people as secured by the Firmans of the

Sultan, and the strict observance of the international engagements of Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government did not consider that a case for intervention had at present arisen, since on the part of the Notables and the new Government the intention was avowed to maintain international engagements. But should the necessity arise, it would be their wish that such intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe.

In that event it would also, in their opinion, be right that the Sultan should be a

party to any proceedings or discussions that might ensue.

" Egypt No. 7 (1882)." (February 6 to May 6.)

This series commences (p. 1) with an approval of Sir E. Malet's language to Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Notables, respecting a counter-project of Organic Law proposed by the Notables and their claim to vote the Budget (see also pp. 3, 4, 5, 22, 27, 43, 52).

On the 6th February Lord Lyons telegraphed that Lord Granville's proposal for communicating with the other Powers was agreed to by M. de Freycinet, on condition that it was well understood that the French Government reserved its adhesion to any military intervention in Egypt, and that it would examine that question when the

necessity for intervention should have arisen (p. 3).

On the receipt of this telegram Lord Granville forwarded to Lord Lyons a draft of despatch to the other Powers for the concurrence of M. de Freycinet, and stated that Her Majesty's Government agreed to the reservation made by the French Government respecting military intervention (p. 4). After some further communication with M. de Freycinet, the terms of the Circular to the Powers were agreed upon, and it was sent off to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and St. Petersburgh, on the 11th February, as follows:-

"The reports at present received from Egypt are not of a nature to excite apprehension of early disorder and anarchy. But we are in presence of a crisis which may give rise to an encroachment upon the order of things established by the Firmans of the Sultan and by the international engagements of Egypt, whether with England and France alone, or with all the other Powers. Her Majesty's Government are informed that the answer of the four Powers to the recent protest of the Porte against the Declaration made to the Khedive by the English and French Governments on the 8th January is based on a recognition of existing arrangements in Egypt.

"Her Majesty's Government are now agreed with the Government of France that, in view of events which might occur in Egypt, it is desirable to ascertain whether the other Powers would be willing to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the question on the basis of the maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign and of the Khedive; of international engagements and the arrangements existing under them, whether with England and France alone, or with those two nations and the other Powers; the preservation of the liberties secured by the Firman of the Sultan; together

with the prudent development of Egyptian institutions,

"The Governments of England and France do not consider that a case for discussing the expediency of an intervention has at present arisen, since on the part of the Chamber of Notables and of the new Government the intention is avowed to maintain international engagements; but should the case arise, they would wish that any such eventual intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe.

"In that event it would also, in their opinion, be right that the Sultan should be a party to any

proceeding or discussion that might ensue. "Your Excellency will read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and leave a copy with him should he desire it" (p. 10).

On the 22nd March (p. 89) Lord Granville had a conversation with M. Tissot, the newly-appointed French Ambassador, in the course of which he mentioned to him, as a personal suggestion, that the French and English Governments might each send to Egypt some person of financial knowledge to assist the Agents. M. Tissot promised to communicate this to M. de Freycinet, but thought that the new French Controller, M. Brédif, who had succeeded M. de Blignières, was qualified to give any assistance required. Lord Granville remarked that this would not meet the suggestion, which was that there should be two independent technical advisers. The suggestion has not been carried out.

On the 12th April (p. 87) Sir E. Malet telegraphed that numerous arrests had been made among officers and soldiery, in consequence of an alleged conspiracy to murder

On the 24th April (p. 91) Lord Granville said to M. Tissot that the situation of Arabi Pasha.

affairs in Egypt, although alarming, did not yet seem to call for active intervention, but it would have a great moral effect in that country if the English and French Governments were able to announce to their respective Parliaments that not only were they prepared, with the concurrence of Europe, to take a step at once towards an arrangement with the Egyptian Government, but that they were also agreed as to the policy to be pursued in case of matters coming to a crisis, which they still hope may be averted. It would be sufficient to state that the agreement existed, without giving any public definition of the policy decided on.

The procedure to be resorted to in case of necessity might, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, consist in asking the Sultan to send a General with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian army, with a well-defined agreement that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General who would be associated with him. Care must also be taken so to frame the arrangement that the functions of the three Commissioners should in no way detract from the position, or trench upon the duties of the French and English

Representatives.

On the 30th (p. 92) Lord Dufferin telegraphed that Arabi Pasha had imprisoned a certain Osman, an Agent sent by the Sultan to Egypt. This had incensed the Sultan, and he had asked the Representatives of Germany, Austria, and Italy to induce their Governments to intervene against Arabi. The three Ambassadors had simply transmitted the message to their Governments. His Majesty did not address

himself to the Russian Ambassador.

On the 2nd May (p. 100) Lord Lyons was instructed to inform M. de Freycinet that the present proposal of Her Majesty's Government was made as one to which the two Governments should agree to have recourse in case of need only, and that its aim and object is to avoid the necessity of any armed intervention in Egypt, to all forms of which there are great objections. Her Majesty's Government understood the proposal as not committing either France or England in any degree to a Turkish armed intervention. But they desired also to retain their full liberty of considering, in concert with the French Government, what form armed intervention should take if the occasion should unfortunately arise. M. de Freycinet would seem to have some misgiving that Turkish intervention is desired by Her Majesty's Government. Lord Lyons was to assure him that this is quite opposed to their wishes. If it were not for the objections of the French Government, to which they gave, and would wish in the future to give, great weight, they were disposed to believe that Turkish intervention would be less objectionable than any other form of intervention which had yet been suggested. But they had not altered their opinion that any kind of armed intervention should be avoided if possible.

On the same day (p. 100) Sir E. Malet telegraphed that the proceedings of the court-martial had been secret, and the prisoners undefended by counsel, and he trusted

the Khedive had not countersigned the sentence.

The number of arrests had amounted to fifty, among whom was Osman Pasha Rifky, formerly Minister for War, and who had been dismissed on the demand of the

revolted regiments at the military outbreak on the 1st February, 1881.

On the 3rd (p. 101) Count Münster said that Prince Bismarck was anxious, as far as possible, to maintain the status quo in Egypt, but that he thought that if intervention became necessary, Turkish intervention was the least objectionable form. Prince Bismarck, Count Münster added, was opposed to a joint Anglo-French occupation, believing that it would lead to disagreement and quarrels between England and France, which, whatever might be said of his supposed policy, he would be glad to see avoided.

Count Münster concluded by saying that Prince Bismarck had given no decided opinion upon the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, that in case of need three Generals, Turkish, English, and French, should be sent to Egypt to restore discipline in the army, but that he had expressed himself as willing to accept and support any method of action upon which England and France might come to an agreement.

The French Agent saw the Khedive on the 3rd (p. 102), and advised him not to countersign the sentence, but to adopt some middle course, such as pardoning or com-

muting. Sir E. Malet thought he should insist on a new trial.

On the 4th (p. 104), the Khedive summoned the Agents of Germany, Italy, Austria, and Russia, and asked their advice. The Italian Agent recommended his refusing to sanction the sentence. The others declined to give an opinion without instructions.

On the 5th (p. 106), M. de Freycinet instructed the French Agent to avoid giving

advice to the Khedive at once if His Highness consulted him separately, but to ask for time for reflection, and then to confer with his English colleague, so that the advice of both might always be identical. Moreover, if he could not agree with his English

colleague, then to refer the matter home for instructions.

An identic telegram was sent to Sir E. Malet on the 6th, who telegraphed the same afternoon that the Khedive had received an official telegram from the Porte, saying that it had learnt by a public telegram that several Ottoman subjects had been condemned to degradation and exile by a court-martial; that among them was Osman Rifky, holding the rank of General, which, being given by the Sultan, can only be taken away by him; that this being contrary to the Firmans, the Porte desired the matter to be referred to it.

The Khedive replied that the sentence, as published, was exact; that as soon as he had finished the examination of the trial himself he would refer the matter to the Porte, whose privileges he desired to maintain, and that he was always ready to listen

to instructions from it.

His Highness communicated the telegram and his reply to his Ministry that morning. They were exceedingly annoyed at his answer, and begged him to withdraw or modify it, saying that he was surrendering privileges acquired by the country. He denied this, and refused to change his answer, on which they left.

The English and French Agents, in an identic telegram of the 7th, suggested that the Khedive might avoid sanctioning the sentence by declaring that (using his prero-

gative) he commuted the penalties.

On the 8th (p. 108) the President of the Council said to Sir E. Malet that if the Porte ordered the sentence of the court-martial to be cancelled, and Turkish Commissioners were sent, they would be repulsed, if necessary, by force.

M. de Freycinet told Lord Lyons on the 8th (p. 108) that he thought the Khedive should grant a full pardon immediately, and Lord Granville concurred, and directed

Sir E. Malet to concert upon this advice with his French colleague.

It subsequently appeared that some confusion had arisen at the French Foreign Office in regard to the expressions "commutation" and "free pardon," and that M. de Freycinet meant to use the former expression, which was, in fact, adopted by the Agents at Cairo. On the 9th of May the Khedive issued a Decree commuting the sentence on the forty officers to simply leaving Egypt without further penalty (p. 110).

On the 10th (p. 116) Sir E. Malet telegraphed that the Khedive had summoned the Representatives of the Great Powers again, and had informed them that the President had insisted on his changing the Decree by inserting that the prisoners should be erased from the rolls. His Highness had refused, whereupon the President had menaced him, had spoken slightingly of the protection which the foreign Representatives could afford him, and had said that, unless he yielded, there would be a

general carnage of Europeans. At the request of their colleagues (p. 117) the French and English Agents went to the President of the Council, and said that, on the previous day, he had requested their good offices to prevent intervention of the Porte in the matter of the courtmartial; that they had that morning, by advising the Khedive to issue the Decree, rendered the President the service which he had asked; that they were surprised to learn that, in return for this service, he had threatened danger to our fellow-countrymen, had spoken insultingly of their power to protect the Khedive, and had menaced His Highness. They had therefore come to ask officially, for themselves and in the

names of their colleagues, whether danger existed in case the Khedive did not alter the Decree, in order that they might all inform their Governments. His Excellency absolutely denied that he had menaced the Khedive, or had used any of the language attributed to him. He said also that the question of altering the

Decree was a request which the Khedive was free to grant or refuse. The Agents asked what would be the consequence of refusal. He replied that he could not say,

beyond that he would submit it to the Council.

He finally declared that it was impossible to work with a Khedive who had so little regard for accuracy in his statements, and that he should resign; but that,

having resigned, he could not be answerable for the consequences.

In the afternoon (p. 117), in company with his colleagues of France, Germany, and Austria, Sir E. Malet asked the President of the Council to-day to give them an account of the situation. He replied that as the Ministry and the Khedive could not agree, and as the Ministry could not retire, they had convoked the Chamber of Representatives to meet immediately in order to submit to it the situation. In the meantime, the Ministry guaranteed public security and the personal safety of the Khedive. The

Chamber was convoked by the Ministry alone. The authority of the Khedive had not been asked. The accusation against His Highness was that he had attempted to diminish the autonomy of Egypt, and that he had acted many times without consulting his Ministry. They did not doubt that it was intended to dethrone the Khedive if the Chamber would lend itself to it. The President said that the Chamber might meet in three days. He also said that he intended to hold no further communication with the Khedive till the difference between them was decided by the Chamber.

Sir E. Malet also reported that the relations between the Khedive and the Ministry being broken off, the situation had become most serious. The guarantee of the safety of Europeans and of the Khedive given by the Ministers could scarcely be

relied upon as effective.

On the 11th Mr. Wyndham, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, was told to take any steps he considered expedient to prevent the Sultan resenting the Khedive's proceedings in regard to the court-martial, and Mr. Wyndham telegraphed that the Porte had no intention of sending Commissioners to Egypt, and that no extraordinary measures would be taken without consulting Her Majesty's Government.

Lord Lyons was at the same time told to inform M. de Freycinet (p. 118) that Her Majesty's Government were willing to send two iron-clads to Alexandria to

protect Europeans, informing other Powers in case they liked to do the same.

Sir E. Malet telegraphed on the 11th (p. 118):-

"The Khedive has officially informed my French colleague and me this morning that the Ministry, in defiance of his authority, and in violation of the 9th Article of the Organic Law, has convoked the

"His Decree concerning the court-martial has been sent back to him, but this may be on account of the informality, as the President of the Council asserts that it should have been written on the sentence of the court-martial, and sent to the Minister of War. His Highness has to-day caused this to be done without changing the wording of the Decree in any way.

"The President of the Council, in speaking yesterday of the safety of Europeans, said that it was

also guaranteed in case of a solely Turkish intervention.

"The Delegates are arriving, and go at once to Arabi's house. It is rumoured that the meeting will take place on Saturday, and that the deposition of the Khedive will be immediately pronounced, together with the exile of the whole family of Mehemet Ali, and that the President of the Council will be appointed Governor-General by the national will.

"It is needless to say that the real national will is not expressed by the Chamber acting under

terror of the military, which at present is extreme."

And Lord Lyons telegraphed: M. de Freycinet "thinks that, unless the opinion of the French and British Representatives should be adverse, it would be advisable that, as a first step, France and England should send at once a respectable number of iron-clads to Alexandria, and should make arrangements beforehand, in order that the English and French ships sent thither may be equal in force and may arrive simultaneously.

"His Excellency continues to express himself strongly against armed intervention

on the part of Turkey."

Sir E. Malet (p. 119) also asked whether the Controllers should continue to attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Lord Granville proposed to M. de Freycinet to reply that they should not attend unless summoned, and should decline to give advice, confining themselves to reporting to the Agents.

On the 11th Lord Granville informed Lord Lyons that he had told the French

Ambassador-

"That time was precious, and that I was very desirous not to throw backwards and forwards the responsibility of a proposal. On our part, we were ready to consider, with every wish to accede to it, any proposal that might be made by M. de Freycinet; but, as regarded any proposal of my own, I could think of nothing better to suggest than the plan I had already mentioned of sending three military Commissioners, Turkish, English, and French. Under the present urgent circumstances, I should have been ready to accompany it with a threat of Turkish intervention. I believed that such a threat would be the most likely means of preventing the necessity for any intervention; and I

repeated my wish to avoid such intervention, if possible. "As regards the question of sending vessels of war to Alexandria, as to which I understood that M. de Freycinet had asked for an opinion from the French Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, I said that I had already instructed your Excellency, by telegraph, to state to the French Government that we were willing to send two iron-clads to that port to protect the life and property of Europeans, and that, in that case, we should propose to inform the other Powers of the step we were taking, in case they should like to do the same. If Turkey should claim to be represented in the naval demonstration, I saw no objection to admitting her participation. I understood that the depth of the port of Alexandria was not sufficient for most iron-clad vessels, and it might therefore be found expedient that one of our two vessels should be an unarmoured ship. This, however, was immaterial for the purpose for which they were required.

"I remarked that such a demonstration could hardly in itself be a sufficient remedy or safeguard for the present condition of affairs, but that it might be useful as a moral support to the three Commissioners if it were decided to send them.

"In case ships of war were sent to Alexandria, we should also propose to send a small ship of war

to Suez, for the protection of Europeans there against any outbreak.

"I proposed, I said, to telegraph to Sir E. Malet that the attitude of the French and English Representatives should be to declare positively that they objected to any change in the status quo, and

I should be glad also to encourage the Porte to support the same view.

"In conclusion, I alluded to a request which the Controllers-General had made for advice as to their attitude towards the Ministers in the present juncture. I said that I was of opinion that they should continue to attend the meetings of the Council if invited to do so, and should keep the English and French Representatives fully informed of what passed, but that they should abstain from themselves taking any part in the proceedings."

A Reuter's telegram of the 12th stated that the Notables disapproved of the Chamber having been convened without the authority of the Khedive, and were opposed to the course taken by Arabi Bey.

In a speech in the Chamber of the 12th May, M. de Freycinet said, p. 122:-

"Nous sommes préoccupés, et nous l'avons toujours été, de deux choses: en premier lieu, conserver à la France la situation particulière, la situation previlégiée, justement privilégiée, qu'elle a en Égypte (très bien! très bien!); l'influence prépondérante que lui ont acquise les concours de toute nature qu'elle a prodigués à ce pays depuis plus d'un siècle, l'influence que lui assure la présence d'une colonie Française, qui porte haut et ferme, et avec dignité, le drapeau de la patrie. (Applaudissements.)

"J'ajoute, et c'est là la seconde partie de l'objectif auquel tend notre politique, que nous avons à cœur de maintenir l'indépendance de l'Égypte, telle que les Firmans reconnus par les Puissances de l'Europe l'ont établie.

Lord Granville agreed with M. de Freycinet in reply to an inquiry from the Controllers (p. 129), that they should attend if summoned, but confine themselves to reporting what passed without taking part in the proceedings.

On the 12th (p. 128) Lord Granville received a despatch from Lord Lyons, con-

taining the following proposals from M. de Freycinet:-

"France and England each to send ships of war of sufficiently light draught of water to be able

to enter the harbour of Alexandria.

"France would send two middle-sized iron-clads ('cuirassés moyens'), three dispatch-boats ('avisos'), and one gun-boat ('canonnière'). One of the iron-clads, one dispatch-boat, and the gun-boat might be at Alexandria on Monday next. The three others could not be there till Wednesday or Thursday. The French Government thinks it very desirable that the three first should arrive in conjunction with three similar English ships, so that the complete accord between the two countries should be manifest to every eye.

"A light French vessel would also be sent to Suez in conformity with your Lordship's sugges-

tion.

"The orders to these ships should be given immediately; but, as a measure of extreme prudence, the French Government telegraphs to M. Sienkiewicz to inquire whether the appearance of the ships at Alexandria would be likely to place British and French citizens in danger in Egypt. This does not appear probable; but, at any rate, the preparations for sending the ships may be proceeded with, as the answer from the Consul-General will arrive in time for them to be stopped if necessary.

"The French and English Governments to telegraph to their Ambassadors at Constantinople to

request the Porte to abstain, for the present, from all intervention or interference in Egypt.

"The two Governments to telegraph also to their Ambassadors at Rome, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, and Vienna, to inform the Governments to which they are accredited of the dispatch of the ships to Alexandria, and to ask those Governments to send to their Representatives at Constantinople instructions similar to those to be sent to the French and English Representatives there.

"In the present circumstances, and considering that Tewfik Pasha has lately acted on the advice of England and France, the French Government consider that it is the bounden duty of the two Governments to support His Highness as far as circumstances will allow, and they will co-operate

loyally, and without any arrière-pensée, with the English Government in this sense.

"The French Government continue to be opposed to Turkish intervention, but they would not call intervention the case in which Turkish forces were summoned to Egypt by them, and operated there under their control, for an object, and on conditions which they should have themselves determined.

"If, after the arrival of their ships at Alexandria, the French Government should consider it advisable that troops should be landed, they would have recourse neither to English nor to French

troops, but would call for Turkish troops on the conditions above specified.

"The Consuls-General to be instructed to recognize as legal no other authority than that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into relations with any other de facto Government except for the purpose of securing the safety of their countrymen.

"M. de Freycinet does not consider that to send Commissioners would be opportune at the present moment; first, because the uncertainty in which we are as to the various events which may occur

would lead to our giving discretionary powers ('mandat en blane') to the Commissioners, and this would throw a dangerous responsibility on the Governments; secondly, because the necessarily delicate business of drawing up instructions suited to contingencies so complicated, and the communication of such instructions to the Powers with the view of obtaining general concurrence, would take a long time, whereas it is, in M. de Freycinet's opinion, indispensable to act very rapidly."

The French Ambassador made a similar communication on the same day (p. 129).

Lord Granville replied (p. 130) on the 13th:-

"1. Her Majesty's Government concur in the proposal to send ships of war to Alexandria and one French and one English vessel to Suez. Instructions have been sent by the Board of Admiralty for three ships of war to be at once in readiness to proceed to Alexandria, but the vessels have been directed to proceed to Suda Bay to await orders.

"2. Her Majesty's Government will telegraph to the British Ambassador at Constantinople to request the Porte to abstain for the present from all intervention or interference in Egypt; but they think it desirable to instruct his Excellency to intimate in guarded language that it is not improbable

that further propositions may be made hereafter to the Porte.

"3. The instructions proposed by the French Government shall be at once sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Rome, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, and Vienna. Her Majesty's Government would, however, wish that your Excellency should suggest to the French Government whether, in view of the very large force which it is proposed should be dispatched to Alexandria by England and France, it might not be as well, if not inconsistent with the other objects which M. de Freycinet has in view, that the other Powers, including Turkey, should be invited to have their flags represented.

"4. It is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, undoubtedly the bounden duty of the two Governments to support the Khedive under present circumstances, and they gladly welcome the

loyal co-operation tendered by the French Government.

"5. Her Majesty's Government concur in the 5th, 6th, and 7th proposals of the French Government, and they are ready to defer to the objections of the French Government to the mission of the three Generals at the present moment."

The French and English Agents were instructed on the 14th (p. 131) to send for Arabi Bey, and to tell him that if order is disturbed he will find England and France, Europe and Turkey against him, and that he will be held personally responsible; but that provided he remains loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person will be favourably regarded.

On the same day the President of the Chamber begged the Khedive to accept the

retirement of the Prime Minister.

The Agents, in consideration of the coming action of the Powers, and the importance of nothing happening in the meanwhile to the Khedive, advised His Highness to accept.

They agreed to the nomination of any one except Arabi Pasha.

The President also said to His Highness that the Chamber ought to be convoked if the fleets arrived; that it would then pass a vote of censure on the Ministry for having necessitated foreign interference, and would insist that the military leaders should retire from the country.

Sir E. Malet also telegraphed:-

"My French colleague and I think that the political advantage of the arrival of the combined squadron at Alexandria is so great as to override in consideration the danger which it might possibly cause to Europeans in Cairo.

"Its arrival in support of the Khedive, who now seems to have with him all but the Military

party, diminishes the danger."

Lord Lyons was also instructed (p. 132) to ask M. de Freycinet, with reference to the proposal in the French suggestions for a joint course of action in the present crisis in Egypt, in what manner the French Government proposed that French and English control should be exercised over Turkish troops if the use of troops should become a necessity, which Her Majesty's Government hoped might not be the case.

This question has never been answered.

The following instruction was sent by telegraph to M. Tissot by the French Government on the 14th, and also communicated to Lord Lyons (p. 133):—

"I have received the telegram by which you inform me that the English Government accepts the proposal of the French Government, and I congratulate myself on this event, which strengthens so happily the understanding between the two countries.

"We send to Suda, to join the English squadron, the three ships which we destined for Alexandria, and which were awaiting orders at the Piræus. We also send a ship to Suez.

"We think that the presence of the squadron at Alexandria will have a decided effect, even at Cairo. In fact, it results from the last reports from M. Sienkiewicz that great irresolution prevails among the chiefs of the Movement party. The arrival of the Anglo-French ships at such a moment

may produce a sort of disorganization of the revolutionary party, and render the Khedive master of the situation.

"I should think it well to send information to our Agents at Cairo immediately, in the following terms:—

"An Anglo-French squadron is assembling at Suda, and will soon enter Alexandria. We reserve to ourselves to take such other means as we may deem necessary to make order respected and to maintain the authority of the Khedive. You will come to an understanding with your English [French] colleague, in order to make such use of this telegram as circumstances may appear to you to call for."

"I propose to telegraph to our Ambassadors at Constantinople in the following terms:—

"In consequence of the last even; that have happened in Egypt, the French and English Governments have determined to send to Alexandria a squadron which is at this moment assembling at Suda. In order not to add complication to the state of things, it is of importance that the Turkish Government should abstain from all intervention and all interference in Egypt. I request you to address recommendations to the Porte in this sense. It would be desirable that you should hint to the Sultan, in very moderate terms, that it is not improbable that further proposals may be made to the Porte hereafter. You will come to an understanding about these steps with your English [French] colleague, who will receive similar instructions.'

"I am not of opinion that we should at present invite the other Powers to send ships by the side of ours. It is not, in my judgment, for our interest that we should in this way take an initiative which would deprive the Anglo-French action of the directive character, which Europe herself assigns to it, and appears desirous to leave to it, in Egypt. I propose to telegraph to our Ambassadors at

Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh in the following terms:-

"In consequence of the last events in Egypt, the French and English Governments have thought it right to agree with each other to send to Alexandria a squadron which is at this moment assembling at Suda. The object of this demonstration is to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to uphold the legal order of things in Egypt which Europe has recognized, and in the maintenance of which she is interested. In order not to add complication to the state of things, the two Governments have thought it right to instruct their Ambassadors at Constantinople to recommend the Porte to abstain from all intervention and all interference in Egypt, but they have at the same time reserved to themselves to make further proposals to the Porte in case of need. We should be glad if the Government to which you are accredited would send instructions in the same sense to its Ambassador at Constantinople."

Lord Granville told M. Tissot, on the 15th, that Mr. Gladstone agreed with him in regretting that the other Powers had not been invited to co-operate. Her Majesty's Government thought this a mistake, but as the French Government held absolutely to it, and as they had gone so far to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, they had concurred in the course taken.

On the 15th, Sir E. Malet was informed that an Anglo-French squadron was assembling at Suda, and would soon enter Alexandria. Her Majesty's Government reserved to themselves to employ such other means as they might deem necessary to

make order respected, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive.

A Circular telegram, in the terms agreed upon with the French Government, was sent to Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburgh, and the following to Lord Dufferin (p. 136):—

"In consequence of the last events in Egypt, the English and French Governments have determined to send to Alexandria a squadron, which is at this moment assembling at Suda. In order not to complicate the situation, it is important that the Turkish Government should abstain from all intervention and interference in Egypt. I request you to address recommendations to the Porte in this sense. It would be desirable that you should be able to let the Sultan understand, in very moderate terms, that it would not be improbable that further proposals might be made to the Porte later. You will concert about these steps with your French colleague, who will receive similar instructions."

This telegram crossed a telegram from Constantinople (p. 137), reporting that the Porte, under present circumstances, saw no necessity for sending either ships or troops; it therefore saw no reason why other Powers should adopt such a measure.

This telegram having been read to Lord Granville by Musurus Pasha, Lord Granville told him "that, in deciding to send an English and French fleet to Alexandria, we had no desire to derogate from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, but that the circumstances were pressing, and immediate action was necessary. Our desire was to maintain the status quo, and the other Powers had recognized our preponderating

interests in Egypt.

Lord Granville added "that any hasty or independent action on the part of the Porte at this moment could only have a prejudicial effect on the situation, and might possibly interfere with the execution of the favourable intentions we had towards Turkey in case of further eventualities. Her Majesty's Government and that of France had therefore instructed their Representative at Constantinople to express a hope that the Porte would refrain from any intervention or interference."

Lord Lyons was told, on the 15th (p. 138), to inform the French Government of the instructions to Admiral Sir B. Seymour:—

"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans, landing force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ship's guns without instructions from home. You may, in concert with French, send a ship to Port Said if necessary to protect British subjects."

On the same day the French Government proposed and the English concurred that the fleets which had met at Suda Bay should proceed to Alexandria.

In the meanwhile, the political crisis was still continuing at Cairo, the President of the Chamber declaring to the Agents that it was impossible to change the Ministry

as long as the military power continued to be vested in Arabi Pasha.

Public telegrams having announced the departure of the Anglo-French squadron for Alexandria, the French and English Agents proceeded to the Khedive and stated that an Anglo-French squadron would soon enter Alexandria; and that the Governments of England and France reserved to themselves the right to employ such other means as they might deem necessary to make order respected, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive. They further said to His Highness that it was essential that there should be a Government with which they could negotiate; and that the Khedive being unable to form a new Ministry, they requested him to re-enter into relations with the present one, informing it that, in consequence of the serious news which they had imparted to him, personal questions must be set aside, and that the Ministers must enter into negotiations with them in order to avoid the danger which menaced the country (p. 139).

Arabi Pasha, who was the Minister for War, told the Agents, in reply to their joint communication, that he would guarantee public order and the safety of His Highness the Khedive as long as he remained Minister; but that in the event of an Anglo-French squadron arriving he could not guarantee public safety, and gave a formal denial that either he or any of the Ministers had harboured a design for the

deposition of the Khedive.

On the 16th, a report was received from Sir E. Malet of a move on the part of the Bedouins (p. 140), who were discontented at the threatened withdrawal of certain privileges, and towards whom the Ministry thought it better to adopt conciliatory measures, and invited some of the most influential Sheikhs to Cairo. At the interview promises were made on one side to maintain all the old privileges, and on the other to afford all necessary assistance in case of need. The Bedouins then asked for permission to import a quantity of repeating rifles for the defence of the country. The expediency of giving this permission was thus explained in a letter which he forwarded:—

"Il y eut encore un conciliabule le 26, à Belbeis, point d'arrivée de la route des caravanes dans la Province de Charkieh. Le Gouvernement fit déclarer alors qu'il abandonnait ses projets et réclama au Caire la présence des Sheikhs Bédouins pour cimenter la paix; ceux-ci se rendirent à l'invitation le 30, et furent reçus hier par le Khédive, qui les confirma dans leurs immunités, puis, ce matin, ils furent convoqués au Ministère de la Guerre; là une séance solennelle eut lieu: Arabi Pacha, dans une longue allocution, déclara qu'il n'avait en vue que le bien du pays et la défense de l'Islamisme, contre le Christianisme envahissant, qu'enfin il désirait compter les Bédouins au nombre des plus fidèles adeptes de sa politique.

"Sur l'acquiescement de l'Assemblée, Arabi Pacha fit apporter un Koran, sur lequel chacun des

Bédouins vint prêter serment en sa présenae.

"Les Bédouins demandent l'autorisation d'importer pour leur usage personnel (et défense de la patrie) des armes à tir rapide; cette permission pourrait bien être accordée; ce serait un moyen d'introduire des officiers dans les tribus sous prétexte d'enseigner le maniement de ces armes nouvelles. compensation à l'insuccès des tentatives pour embrigader les Bédouins" (p. 141).

The President of the Council and the Minister of War visited Sir E. Malet separately on the 16th, and gave assurances of the maintenance of public tranquillity on the arrival of the combined squadrons.

The French Government told their Agent that they regretted the "replâtrage" of the Egyptian Ministry (p. 144); and the Parliamentary Paper closes with the order given by the Admiralty (p. 145) for a gun-boat to proceed to Suez from Aden, to act in concert with the French vessel detached for the same duty.

"Egypt No. 8 (1882)." (May 17 to May 31.)

This series commences with some papers respecting the movements of the Anglo-

French squadron.

On the 18th May Sir E. Malet reported that, although the squadron had not yet arrived off Alexandria, the effect of its appearance had been discounted, and tranquillity reigned in Cairo:-

"The announcement, however, in a public telegram, that the Porte has protested against our

dispatching vessels, has produced a bad effect.

"If it is known that, in the event of the Egyptian Government refusing to come to an arrangement, Turkish intervention must follow, negotiations will probably succeed; but if it is thought that the Porte and the two Powers are not in accord, the consequences may be most serious. I venture, therefore, to urge that it is desirable that, before commencing negotiations, an agreement should be come to with the Porte" (p. 2).

Lord Granville thereupon instructed Lord Lyons to ask M. de Freycinet whether there was any objection to speaking openly to the Turkish Government, especially as some portion of the facts had already transpired at Paris (p. 2).

On the 16th Lord Dufferin and the French Ambassador (p. 2) made to the Porte the identic communication as instructed on the 15th. None of the other Ambassadors

had received instructions, but the German Chargé d'Affaires intimated unofficially that it would be unadvisable for the Ottoman Government to complicate the situation.

Saïd Pasha told Lord Dufferin that the Sultan was much displeased at the action of the Western Powers, and a Circular was addressed to the Turkish Representatives arguing that the Egyptian Minister having submitted to the Khedive the crisis no longer existed, and the naval demonstration was unnecessary, adding, "C'est encore par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement Ottoman, et rien que par son intermédiaire, que les mesures d'apaisement et de la sauvegarde de ce même statu quo Egyptien devraient être concertées et appliquées."

Lord Dufferin was told in reply (p. 3):-

"Your Excellency is at liberty to use any of the information in your possession which may tend to calm the apprehensions of His Majesty as to the character and objects of the naval demonstration at Alexandria."

On the 18th (p. 6), Lord Dufferin was informed by Saïd Pasha that the Sultan had decided to maintain an attitude of perfect friendliness towards the Western Powers, and was willing to discuss the maintenance of the status quo on the understanding that the fleets would remain at Alexandria for as short a time as possible.

The English and French Governments thereupon agreed to suspend the dispatch of further vessels (p. 12), and Lord Dufferin was instructed (p. 8) to convey to His Majesty, in suitable terms, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, the assurance of their appreciation of his friendly action, and of their desire not to keep the fleet a day longer at Alexandria than was necessary fully to restore the authority of the Khedive, whom they were strongly in favour of retaining in his present position.

The following were the instructions sent to the French Admiral on the 19th

(p. 9):-

"Une fois arrivé à Alexandrie, vous vous mettrez en communication avec le Consul-Général, qui vous indiquera, s'il y a lieu, ce que vous pourrez avoir à faire pour donner un appui moral au Khédive. Vous vous abstiendrez, jusqu'à instructions contraires, de tout acte matériel de guerre, à moins que vous ne soyez attaqué ou que vous n'ayez à protéger la sécurité des Européens."

Lord Ampthill having inquired (p. 9) whether the German Government had sent instructions to recommend the Porte to abstain from interference was informed that Prince Bismarck, on learning that the Governments of Austria and Russia felt some hesitation in the matter, had not thought himself at liberty to separate the action of Germany from that of Austria and Russia.

The Khedive told the English and French Agents on the 19th that he had informed his Minister of War that all military preparations were in contravention of

His Highness' orders.

Arabi Pasha professed his obedience, but continued actively to push on his

preparations.

Sir E. Malet while reporting this added that, in order to arrive at a settlement, the first step must necessarily be the resignation of the Ministry and the surrender of the military leaders, which could probably be compassed if their persons, rank, and property are guaranteed, but they should be obliged to quit Egypt for a year at least.

He added that, if this were obtained, and a Ministry were formed under Chérif Pasha, there would be little difficulty with the remaining questions; but if the Porte showed itself hostile to the action of the two Powers, resistance would be shown. According to the compact between England and France, Turkish troops were to suppress such resistance, but the fact of its not being generally known that the Sultan will intervene might probably make that very intervention necessary which both of the two Powers are anxious to avert.

In reply to an inquiry (p. 8) from Lord Granville as to whether there were very strong objections to speaking openly at this moment, either at Constantinople or elsewhere, of the agreement to call in Turkish troops, in case military intervention in Egypt should prove to be unavoidable, M. de Freycinet said that he had agreed that Turkish troops under the control of France and England should be employed rather than French and English, if the employment of troops should be absolutely unavoidable; but he regarded this as a measure to be resorted to at the last extremity, and not before he could show the Chambers that the last extremity had come, and

that no less objectionable course remained open.

M. de Freycinet went on to say that in answer to the Turkish Circular he had authorized the French Ambassador at Constantinople to tell the Sultan that if any act which fell within the competence of the Sovereign became necessary, it was of course to the Sultan that the French Government would have recourse. This was, his Excellency said, in conclusion, quite as far as he could go; that if an act falling within the competence of the Sultan became necessary, it would naturally be to the Sultan that recourse would be had; and again, that if the question went beyond the protection of fellow-countrymen, and the safeguard of special interests, the co-operation of the Sultan would be necessarily brought into play.

On the 20th, joint instructions were sent to the two Agents (p. 15):-

"1. To declare that the two Governments intervene to maintain the status quo, and, consequently, to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him, and without which the status quo is incessantly threatened.

"2. To advise the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable moment, on the arrival of the ships or afterwards, to call for the resignation of his Ministers, and to form a new Ministry, at the head of which should be placed Chérif Pasha, or another

personage offering equivalent guarantees.

"3. To let it be understood that, if everything passes off well and tranquilly, indulgence will be shown, no prosecution will be made, the persons, the property, and the rank of Arabi Bey and his friends will be respected, and, in a word, the change of Ministry will not have any character of vengeance or reprisals. But not to say anything to prevent ordering them to leave the country, if this be desired by the incoming Ministry."

On the same day (p. 17) Lord Granville begged Musurus Pasha to assure the Porte that if any act became necessary involving an exercise of sovereign power, it was to the Sultan that we should apply, and he remarked (p. 17) to Count Münster that M. de Freycinet entertained strong objections to making any public avowal of an intention to resort, in case of need, to Turkish troops for an enforcement of order in

On the same day the Agents telegraphed:—

"Until the supremacy of the Military party is broken the Khedive is powerless to form a new Ministry. No one will accept the task until this is effected.

"We intend, therefore, to propose the following terms to the President of the Council and to Arabi Pasha: That they should quit Egypt together with the three other military Pashas, Toulbeh, Abdul Al, and Ali Fehmy, and that they should not return without the Khedive's sanction, in return for which we should guarantee them their property, rank, and pay.

"We shall endeavour to maintain secrecy in these negotiations, in which M. Monge, the French

Consul, who thoroughy knows Arabic, will act as intermediary."

Owing to M. Monge's unwillingness to undertake this duty, the attempt to

negotiate through him was abandoned.

Sir E. Malet was told that he might attempt the negotiation himself, in conjunction with his French colleague, if he saw no objection. The negotiation was, however, attempted by the President of the Chamber, who talked of procuring the fall of the Ministry by a hostile vote.

Lord Lyons telegraphed on the 23rd (p. 27):-

"I recited to M. de Freycinet this morning the contents of the three following telegrams, namely:

"1. Sir Edward Malet's to your Lordship of the 20th instant, reporting the intention of his

French colleague and himself to come to an arrangement with Arabi Pasha and others to leave the country on condition of retaining their rank, pay, and property;

"2. Your Lordship's telegram to me of yesterday, saying that Her Majesty's Government con-

curred in this arrangement, provided the French Government concurred also;

"3. Sir Edward Malet's to your Lordship of yesterday, reporting the negotiations with Arabi Pasha and his associates entered into by Sultan Pasha in the name of the Notables.

"M.de Freycinet told me that he had not received from M. Sienkiewicz the intelligence contained

in this last telegram.

"He went on to say that he thought it desirable to put distinctly before the French and British Agents the objects at which they should aim in the first instance, and to encourage them to act together for these objects with energy and rapidity, but not to run the risk of embarrassing them by given them detailed directions as to the particular course they should take for the purpose.

With this view he should, he said, send to-day to M. Sienkiewicz a telegram in the following

words: -

"Nous vous autorisons à faire tous ce que vous jugerez nécessaire pour obtenir sans retard les deux résultats:-

"1. Éloignement temporaire d'Arabi Pacha et autres personnages qu'ils vous paraîtrait utile

d'éloigner également.

2. Nomination de Chérif Pacha comme Président du Conseil,

« Vous n'aurez pas besoin de nous en référer pour les mesures à prendre pourvu que vous soyez

d'accord avec votre collègue d'Angleterre.'

"M. de Freycinet said that he should direct M. Sienkiewicz to act upon this telegram if his English colleague should receive the same instructions; and his Excellency begged me to express to your Lordship his earnest hope that you might think it right to send instructions in the same terms to Sir Edward Malet."

On the 24th (p. 31) the following instruction was accordingly sent to Sir E. Malet:-

"If circumstances still admit possibility of executing such instructions as those sent to French Agent, as recorded in Lord Lyons' telegram of yesterday, repeated to you, you may consider yourself as similarly instructed."

In a despatch received on the 23rd (p. 25) Sir E. Malet reported—

"That Arabi Pasha had entered into an argument to prove that the question of the Khedive was an internal one, in which the Powers should not interfere."

On the 23rd the following identic telegram was sent by the English and French Governments to Berlin, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople (p. 27):-

"As my telegram of the 15th instant has informed you, the two Governments of France and England have sent a squadron to Alexandria. The events which gave rise to this determination were so sudden, and the danger which seemed to menace our countrymen so pressing, that time was absolutely wanting for us to come to a previous understanding with the other Powers. Since then a reconciliation has taken place at Cairo, but besides that it did not appear durable, the news of it did not reach the two Governments until their ships were already on their way.

"No one can have mistaken the character and the object of this demonstration; the declarations made to the British and French Parliaments have prevented all doubt in this respect. The English and French Governments have gone to Egypt, not to make a selfish and exclusive policy prevail, but to secure, without distinction of nationality, the interests in that country of the several European Powers, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive, such as it has been established by the Firmans

of the Sultan recognized by Europe. "They have never proposed to land troops or to resort to a military occupation of the

country.

"Her Majesty's Government intend, when once calm has been restored, and the future secured,

to leave Egypt to herself and to recall their squadron.

"If, contrary to their expectations, a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which shall have appeared to them and to the French Government to be the best. You may read this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and give him a copy if he desires it. Your French colleague has similar instructions."

The President of the Council, May 23 (p. 28), in reply to the proposal of the President of the Chamber, that the Ministry should retire, stated that it would not do so as long as the squadrons are kept at Alexandria.

Arabi Pasha told the French Consul that he must refuse either to retire from his

position or from the country.

The President of the Chamber informed the French Agent that he could no longer rely upon the Deputies, on account of the feeling against the intervention of the two Powers which was now gaining ground.

The Agents hesitated, therefore, to make an official demand to the Ministers, which they knew beforehand would be met with a refusal, until they were in a position

to declare what would be the consequences of such a refusal: Sir E. Malet asked for further instructions.

The present situation, Sir E. Malet reported (p. 28), had been brought about by the Ministers and the people persisting in a belief that the two Powers will not dispatch troops, and that the opposition of France renders a Turkish intervention impossible. In the meanwhile military preparations were being carried on, and fanatical feeling against foreigners sedulously fostered. He was still of opinion that, if the Sultan declared himself at once, and if it were known that troops were ready to be dispatched, there might be no necessity for landing them.

On the 24th Earl Granville proposed to M. Tissot (p. 31) that the two Governments should telegraph a Circular to the Powers requesting them to join in asking the

Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions.

On the 25th Lord Granville (p. 33) told Musurus Pasha—

"That reports had reached me to the effect that the communications addressed to Arabi Bey from Constantinople tended to encourage him in his opposition to the recommendations of England and France, but that I was glad to disbelieve such rumours, because if the Sultan were to go against England and France, it might oblige them, in a matter of such urgency, to take decided steps."

Musurus Pasha said he entirely disbelieved these reports, which were incredible

in themselves, and circulated in order to deceive the two Powers.

Lord Granville told M. Tissot on the 25th (p. 33) that it was of the greatest possible importance that no time should be lost. A speedy and decided announcement might still obviate the necessity of the use of force; but delay would be certain to encourage opposition in Egypt, where it was believed that England and France would not employ force, and that France would not allow its use by Turkey. Delay might also induce the Sultan to seek to take advantage of the situation thus created, and to make matters much more difficult for the two Powers to deal with.

The following note (p. 34) was delivered by the Agents to the President of the

Council on the 25th:-

"The Undersigned, Agents and Consuls-General of England and France, considering that his Excellency Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Delegates, actuated by a sentiment of patriotism, and desirous of assuring the peace and prosperity of Egypt, has proposed to Mahmoud Pasha Sami, President of the Council, as the only means of putting an end to the disturbed state of the country, the following conditions:-

"1. The temporary retirement from Egypt of his Excellency Arabi Pasha, with the maintenance

of his rank and pay;

"2. The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Fehmy Pasha and Abdoullah Pasha, who will also retain their rank and pay;

"3. The resignation of the present Ministry; "Considering that these conditions, by reason of the spirit of moderation which dictated them, may prevent the misfortunes which threaten Egypt, acting in the name and with the authorization of their respective Governments, the Undersigned recommend these conditions to the most serious attention of the President of the Council and his colleagues, and, if necessary, will insist on their fulfilment. The Governments of England and France, in intervening in the affairs of Egypt, have no other object than to maintain the status quo, and consequently to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him, and without which the status quo is continually in danger.

"The intervention of the two Powers being divested of all character of vengeance or reprisal, they will use their good offices to obtain from the Khedive a general amnesty, and will watch over its strict

observance."

Sir E. Malet thus described (p. 35) the reasons which had decided him and his French colleague to present the note:-

"To-day I learnt that the military leaders were circulating amongst the soldiers and officers of the army a document which pretended to set forth the conditions insisted upon by England and France, which were stated to be as follows:-

"1. All the Ministers to be exiled.

"2. All the officers in the Army List to leave Egypt.

"3. Disbandment of the entire army. "4. Occupation of Egypt by foreign troops.

"5. Dissolution of the Chamber. "The French Representative and I, persuaded that the situation would become still further complicated, and even dangerous to the lives of foreigners, if these conditions were believed to be the true ones, determined upon the official step from which we had hitherto shrunk, and presented to the Ministry the note repeated in my other telegram of to-day.

"After asking the President of the Council to return us an answer in the shortest time possible we withdrew, and proceeded to communicate the note to the Khedive and to the President of the

Chamber, who promised to forward a copy of it to all the principal towns of the provinces."

Sir E. Malet's conduct was approved (p. 35).

On the 26th the Austrian Government expressed their gratification at the identic telegram of the 23rd (p. 36).

On the 26th Lord Lyons was instructed (p. 36) to propose to M. de Freycinet

the following draft of a Circular to the Powers:-

"The time has now arrived when the progress of disorder in Egypt threatens to call for some more decided action; and I have to instruct you to propose, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to the Government to which you are accredited, that the Sultan, as Sovereign, shall be jointly invited by the Powers to be prepared to lend to the Khedive a sufficient force to enable His Highness to maintain his authority; this force to be placed under the orders of the Khedive during the time of their sojourn in Egypt; the Sultan to be requested to give a positive assurance that these troops should only be used for the maintenance of the status quo, and that there should be no interference with the liberties of Egypt secured by the previous Firmans of the Sultan, or with existing European agreements; the troops not to remain in Egypt for a longer period than a month, except at the request of the Khedive, and with the consent of the Great Powers, or of the Western Powers as representing Europe; the reasonable expenses of the expedition to be borne by the Egyptian Government.

"Your Excellency will further suggest to M. de Freycinet that it will be advisable to appoint

two military men to advise our Representatives in Egypt during the sojourn of the troops."

The French Government replied on the following day (p. 37):-

"Le Conseil des Ministres, auquel il a soumis votre proposition, a été unanime à penser que rien, dans la situation actuelle, ne justifierait un appel à des troupes Turques. Une note a été remise par nos Consuls-Généraux le 25; le Ministère vient de donner sa démission; les éléments de résistance sont manifestement en voie de désorganisation; il y a donc tout intérêt à attendre la suite des mend compliance. événements."

The Khedive, having informed the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs that he accepted the conditions in the joint English and French note, the Ministry resigned, and the Khedive endeavoured to form another Administration under Chérif Pasha (p. 41), who declined, saying that no Government was possible so long as the military chiefs remained in the country.

On the 27th M. Tricoupi informed Her Majesty's Minister at Athens that he had heard (p. 37) from the Greek Agent at Alexandria that the Greek population residing in that city were extremely alarmed at the political events taking place at present in Egypt, and that they were organizing measures of self-defence in case

disturbances were to break out and they were to be attacked.

M. Tricoupi also stated that he should dispatch a couple of Greek men-of-war to

Alexandria for the protection, if necessary, of Greek subjects settled there.

On the 27th the Khedive (p. 41) received a telegram from the officers of the regiments and the police force stationed at Alexandria, declaring that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi Pasha, and that they allow twelve hours to His Highness to answer, after which delay they will no longer be responsible for public tranquillity.

On the 28th (p. 41) Sir E. Malet reported that the Khedive having summoned the chief personages of the State, one of the Generals present interrupted him while speaking, told him that the army absolutely rejected the joint note, and then withdrew with the other officers. Sir E. Malet added that in consequence of the open defiance of the army the Khedive was powerless to form any Ministry whatever, and that there was certainly no chance of the Khedive's authority being restored so long as the Minister of War and his associates remained in Egypt.

On the 28th Mr. Cookson telegraphed (p. 42) from Alexandria:—

"All quiet here. Local authorities assure me no disorder to be apprehended. Troops have received reply from Cairo, in consequence of which they have engaged to remain quiet at present."

Lord Granville on the same day addressed the following Circular (p. 42) to Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburgh, and invited the French Government to send a a pacific solution of the question, England and France would concert with the other similar Circular, which they did (p. 42). A despatch in the same sense was also sent to Lord Dufferin:-

"I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are agreed that circumstances are changed by the offer of resignation on the part of the Egyptian Ministers, and its

acceptance by the Khedive. There is still, however, danger of military revolt.

"Her Majesty's Government consider it most desirable that no time should be lost by the Sultan, who should send an order to support the Khedive, to reject the accusation of the fallen at Constantinople, desiring him to give the same advice to the Sultan as the other Ministry with regard to His Highness, and to order the three military chiefs, and perhaps also the Ambassadors. ex-President of the Council, to come and explain their conduct at Constantinople.

accredited in this advice."

Speaking to M. Tissot on the subject of this instruction, Lord Granville said:—

"That both Governments had agreed that, in certain eventualities, it would be necessary to have recourse to a Turkish armed force, although we neither desired that measure. Last week Her Majesty's Government believed, and I felt sure we were right in believing, that the moment was come. But before the French Government had answered, news was received of a change of circumstances, viz., the offer of resignation by the Ministry and the acceptance of the offer by the Khedive. Although this did not reassure us as to the ultimate result, it gave us time to take another step, which was that which I had just mentioned to him."

Lord Granville at the same time informed the French Government, through Lord Lyons, that he agreed that circumstances were changed by the resignation of the Egyptian Ministry, and it was advisable to await the course of events, as recommended by M. de Freycinet (p. 43). The draft Circular proposed on the 26th was consequently not acted on.

In the afternoon of the 27th May (p. 43) Arabi Pasha, at the head of about 100 officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Deputies at the house of Sultan Pasha, and demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to any recal-

Nevertheless, almost all present, except the officers, persisted in supporting His Highness. Arabi Pasha and the officers stated that they demanded of the Khedive a Decree reinstating Arabi Pasha as Minister of War, and that they allowed till the morning for its promulgation.

In the evening the Khedive summoned the two Agents, but they could not recom-

Sir E. Malet advised that the Khedive should reply that the whole question was under the consideration of the Porte. He added that the greatest anxiety was felt for the safety of the Khedive, and possibly also of Europeans. The Representatives of Russia, Austria, Italy, and Germany were going to Arabi Pasha to demand guarantees for public security from him. The only possible means of restoring order which Sir E. Malet could suggest was the prompt intervention of the Porte.

On the 28th (p. 44) the Khedive received a telegram from the Grand Vizier, saying that a Turkish Commissioner would be sent if His Highness would officially ask for one. He questioned M. Sienkiewicz and Sir E. Malet as to whether he

should make the request.

On their arrival at the Palace they found with His Highness a few Deputies and Sultan Pasha, who had told him that unless he agreed to reinstate Arabi as Minister of

War his life was not safe; nevertheless, His Highness refused.

With regard to asking for a Turkish Commissioner, Sir E. Malet stated that, if His Highness' life were in danger, he could not give any advice against a step he Proposed if it appeared to be the only chance of safety. M. Sienkiewicz limited mmself to saying that he would request instructions from the French Government, and the two Agents left without giving any further answer, although the Khedive urged the necessity of immediately making some reply to the Grand Vizier.

A despatch received on the 29th reported that the ex-Minister of War and others Who had been convicted by the court-martial had been well treated at the instance of

the two Agents, and had left the country (p. 46).

Prince Bismarck (p. 48) intimated his satisfaction at the Circular of the 23rd. and said that he would be glad to co-operate at any time with the Powers, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government and that of France, towards the maintenance of peace and order, and of the authority of the Khedive, such as it has been established by the Firmans of the Sultan, recognized by Europe.

The Russian Government (p. 48) also expressed satisfaction, and M. de Giers said that he could see no objection to the sending of a squadron for that purpose; but he was glad to see that no military occupation of Egypt was intended, and that, failing

Powers and with Turkey as to what further measures might best be taken.

M. de Giers added that he could not doubt that the sovereignty of Turkey ought to be frankly recognized, but at the same time he thought it would be very unwise to agree to the landing of Turkish troops in Egypt, except under the most stringent conditions and the most rigid control.

The Italian Government also telegraphed (p. 50) on the 28th to their Ambassador

On the 29th (p. 49), Admiral Sir B. Seymour, who had arrived at Alexandria on "I have to request that you will ask for the concurrence of the Government to which you are the 20th in command of the English squadron, telegraphed:—

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"Alexandria is apparently controlled this morning by the Military party.
"Earthworks are being built rapidly abreast of Her Majesty's ship 'Invincible.' I think an increase of force desirable.

"There is much panic at Cairo, and some here.

"I would suggest dispatch of Her Majesty's ships 'Alexandra,' 'Monarch,' and gun-boat."

On the afternoon of the 29th (p. 49), the Chiefs of Religion, including the Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi, all the Deputies, Ulemas, and others, waited on the Khedive, and asked him to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War. He refused; but they besought him saying that, though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain his consent. The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that the guard of the Palace had been doubled, that orders had been given to them to prevent his leaving the Palace for his usual drive, and to fire if he attempted to force his way.

Under these circumstances the Khedive yielded, not to save himself, but to preserve

the town from bloodshed.

On the same day the Khedive made a formal demand to the Sultan to send a

Commissioner to Egypt.

Lord Granville told M. Tissot (p. 51) on the 29th, that Admiral Seymour had telegraphed that the Egyptians were raising earthworks opposite Her Majesty's ship "Invincible," and requested that the three other ships might be sent to join him, and that he proposed to accede to this request, and that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the Sultan should be invited to send a ship of war to Alexandria, and that the Powers should be so informed.

Lord Granville added that Her Majesty's Government had been glad to meet the views of the French Government when there appeared to be a favourable change in the aspect of affairs in Egypt. It was a matter for deep regret that this was no longer

the case.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was accordingly informed on the 30th (p. 55) that the remaining three ships of war would proceed from Suda Bay to Alexandria, and that the Sultan had been told that if he sent a ship of war to carry the declarations he had been requested to make it would have a most favourable reception.

On the 30th the following telegram (p. 54) was received from Mr. Cookson:—

"British residents in Alexandria call upon Her Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. During twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th instant, the town was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, as we believe, actually had cartridges served out, in response to their demand, to be used against Europeans. The crisis is only suspended, but all elements of danger which existed yesterday remain to-day. There is every reason to fear the recurrence of perils which will come, as before, without warning, and against which Europeans are absolutely defenceless. They have not even the means of flight, as, in order to reach the ships in the harbour, they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property. Every day's delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."

Sir E. Malet also telegraphed (p. 55) on the same day:—

"One of the Inspectors of the Control, writing from the provinces, states that the reinstatement of the Minister of War is looked upon by the natives as a sign that the Christians are going to be expelled from Egypt, that they are to recover the land bought by Europeans or mortgaged to them, and that the National Debt will be cancelled.

"Great numbers of Christians are leaving the interior in fear.

"It may be possible for Arabi Pasha to maintain order in places where troops are at his command, but, in stirring up religious fanaticism, he has set on foot a movement which at any moment may pass beyond his control."

M. de Freycinet on the same day, 30th May (p. 55), proposed an immediate Conference.

Lord Granville, in agreeing to it, said:—

"Her Majesty's Government have always desired to obtain the concurrence of Europe in any steps which the present crisis in Egypt might appear to render necessary, and they believe that the proposal for a Conference will be advantageous to England and France, and conducive to a solution of the questions at issue."

Count Kálnoky told Sir H. Elliot on the 30th (p. 57) that he was quite disposed to encourage the Sultan to concur in taking any steps calculated to give support to the Khedive, and to maintain the status quo, but the accounts received from Egypt since the date of Lord Granville's telegram made him doubt whether it would be desirable to recommend the Sultan to summon the military chiefs to Constantinople, with the probability of the order being disregarded.

He proposed, therefore, to send Baron Calice instructions which, while leaving him latitude upon that point, would enable him to associate himself with his colleagues in giving the advice which might be judged advisable, without losing time by referring

Sir E. Malet telegraphed on the 31st (p. 58):-

"There is no change in the situation here. The officers are obtaining by threats signatures to a petition praying for the Khedive's deposition. In order to save the Representatives from being compelled to sign this document, the President of the Chamber has requested them to go to their homes.

"I venture to offer an opinion that if it were known that the Turkish Commission was supported

even by a small force, the victory would already be half won."

Lord Granville telegraphed to Her Majesty's Representatives at Berlin, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople on the 31st (p. 58):-

"I have informed the French Ambassador that the Cabinet have decided to accept the proposal of the French Government, and did so all the more readily, as it was in conformity with the views which they had joined the French Government in expressing to the Powers.

"Her Majesty's Government accepted Constantinople as the capital for the Conference, and proposed that the basis of the negotiations should be the principles laid down in their Circular of the

11th February, viz.:-

"The maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign and of the Khedive; of international engagements, and the arrangement existing under them, whether with England and France alone or with those two nations and the other Powers; the preservation of the liberties secured by the Firmans of the Sultan; together with the prudent development of Egyptian institutions. "You will communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited."

The German, Austrian, and Russian Governments readily accepted the proposal of a Conference.

On the 31st (p. 60) Sir E. Malet was authorized, in the event of the Khedive determining to withdraw to Alexandria, to act according to his discretion, after communicating with the French Agent.

The papers close (p. 60) with the following telegram from Sir E. Malet of

"I have the honour to submit to your Lordship that it is worthy to be remembered that, although at the present moment the Under-Secretaries of State are entrusted with the business of their several epartments, work is actually at a standstill, excepting at the War Ministry. The whole country is labouring under a panic, and a collision might occur at any moment between the Moslems and the Christians. This is a state of affairs which can hardly be expected to continue until the Egyption question is solved by a Conference. It is of immediate and vital importance that the military dictatorship should be broken, and when this has been done there would exist little necessity for the Conference, since it would be easy to form a strong Government favourable to the status quo.

"I would venture to suggest that, if a Conference be agreed upon as a method of producing harmony between all the Powers, the departure of the Turkish Commission should not, on that

account, be delayed."

SUMMARY.

The hereditary Vice-Royalty of Egypt was constituted under Mehemet Ali by the Treaty for the Pacification of the Levant between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey of the 15th July, 1840, and the Firman of the 1st June, 1841. Egypt became a self-governing province, subject to the payment of tribute and the Observance of Political Treaties between the Porte and other Powers.

The route to India by way of Suez and Malta was established in 1830, by Marseilles in 1839. The railway was opened to Suez in 1858. The Suez Canal

in 1869.

By various Firmans the privileges of Egypt were extended, and Massowah and Souakin added.

The first Egyptian loan was in 1862. Eight others ensued until, in 1875, the

Khedive applied for financial advice. Mr. Caves' mission followed. Mr. Rivers Wilson was sent out, and M. Villet. The Commission of the Public Debt was formed in 1876. The Goschen-Joubert Decree was issued in 1876. The Tribunals, formed in that year, issued Judgments which the German Government insisted should be enforced. This led to the Commission of Inquiry in 1878 and to the Commission of Liquidation in 1880.

The first military riot occurred at Cairo on the 18th February, 1879. Mr. Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières, the European Ministers, were dismissed, and Riaz Pasha

assumed office.

Ismaïl Pasha was deposed by an Imperial Iradé on the 26th June, 1879.

Chérif Pasha became Prime Minister under Tewfik Pasha on the deposition of Ismaïl Pasha. He was succeeded by Riaz Pasha on the 18th August.

The second military riot broke out on the 1st February, 1881, when Arabi Bey

refused to obey the Minister of War.

The third military riot took place on the 9th September, 1881, headed by Arabi

The military insisted on the dismissal of the Ministry, and Chérif Pasha, who at

first demurred, consented to take office at the request of the Notables.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire proposed a Joint Anglo-French Military Control as a means of dealing with the rebellious troops, and strongly objected to Turkish troops being sent to Egypt. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that measures of repression should not be taken by the Sultan until their necessity was proved, but saw no objection to a Turkish General being sent. The French Government strongly opposed this proposal, and Lord Dufferin was instructed to dissuade the Porte from sending a General.

Sir E. Malet had an interview with the Sultan when passing through Constantinople (September 13), and said to him that the only object of Her Majesty's Government was to maintain tranquillity and good government in the country, which was England's highway to India, and that if armed repression should become necessary, it

seemed to him that it should be exercised by the sovereign Power.

The Sultan sent two Envoys (October 6), and on the 10th an English and French iron-clad proceeded to Alexandria. Musurus Pasha was told at the same time that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of acting in cordial co-operation with France on Egyptian questions. Whatever rumours or impressions might exist, they had no desire to take any steps towards an English occupation or annexation of the country; still less did they wish to see it occupied or annexed by any other Power. They were anxious to maintain the present status quo, and to uphold the Sultan's rights; but they should object to any attempt to extend those rights, or to use them for the purpose of diminishing the autonomy of Egypt, and interfering in its internal administration.

On the 4th November the despatch was addressed to Sir E. Malet, already published

in "Egypt No. 3, 1882," explaining the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

On the 7th M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire communicated a despatch claiming that in all the services which are shared by the English and French there should be an endeavour to have the participation as identic as possible; and when, in the nature of things, that cannot be, equitable compensation should at least re-establish the balance.

M. Gambetta, who had become Minister for Foreign Affairs in December, told Lord Lyons that the first and most important thing was that the union of the two Powers should be apparent, and that the authority of Tewfik Pasha should be strengthened, and that the enemies of the present system, the adherents of Ismaïl Pasha and Halim Pasha, and the Egyptians generally, should be made to understand that France and England, by whose influence Tewfik had been placed on the throne, would not acquiesce in his being deposed from it.

On the 26th December the Chamber of Notables was opened, and Arabi Bey, who had assumed the attitude of arbiter of the destinies of the country, was appointed

Under Secretary for War.

M. Gambetta said to Lord Lyons that the opening of the Chamber produced a considerable political change in the situation, and suggested that the two Governments should instruct their Representatives to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha assurances of their sympathy and support.

The dual note (presented to Parliament, "Egypt No. 2, 1882") was accordingly agreed upon, Lord Granville making the reservation that Her Majesty's Government must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary.

On the 10th January, 1882, the new Organic Law of the Chamber was introduced which claimed the right of voting the Budget of all the Revenues not assigned to the Public Debt. Chérif Pasha and the Controllers considered that if the Chamber acquired this power, the Council and therefore the Controllers lost their hold of the finances.

Sir E. Malet telegraphed that this Law would place the whole administrative and financial power in the hands of the Notables, and amount to government by

Convention.

This was the commencement of the revolution which has left the country in the hands of Arabi Pasha and the army, as the Khedive and the Notables having no force at their disposal have long been at the mercy, and the mere creatures, of the army.

On the 25th January M. Gambetta proposed that the two Governments should come to an understanding as to the course which they should pursue, and a despatch

was agreed upon.

On the 26th M. Gambetta resigned, although he remained for some days at the

Foreign Office.

On the 30th Lord Lyons was instructed that the union of England and France should be clearly apparent, and that an agreement should be come to between

Her Majesty's Government desired to maintain the rights of the Sovereign and vassal as now established between the Sultan and the Khedive, to secure the fulfilment of international engagements, and to protect the development of institutions within this limit.

They had strong objections to the occupation of Egypt by themselves. There were also serious objections to a joint occupation by England and France. A temporary occupation by Turkey, under the control of England and France, with proper precautions, seemed the least objectionable mode of using force.

M. de Freycinet became Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 31st January. He was much disinclined to any armed intervention, whether by France and England, together

or separately, or by the Porte.

On the 2nd February the Chamber insisted on a change of Ministers, and the

Khedive was obliged to yield.

The new Ministry was appointed on the 5th. Mahmoud Pasha Sami, hitherto Secretary for War, became Prime Minister, and Arabi Bey was promoted to be

Secretary for War.

On the 11th February a Circular was addressed to the Powers inviting them to enter into an exchange of views on the basis of the maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign and of the Khedive; of international engagements and the arrangements existing under them, whether with England and France alone, or with those two nations and the other Powers; the preservation of the liberties secured by the Firman of the Sultan; together with the prudent development of Egyptian institutions.

On the 12th April numerous arrests were made in consequence of an alleged conspiracy to murder Arabi Pasha, among them that of a former Minister of War-Osman Pasha Refki. The Porte protested against his arrest; the court-martial was held in a most irregular manner, and the Khedive eventually commuted its sentence to simply leaving Egypt. The action of the Khedive in commuting the sentence led to a discussion with the President of the Council and to relations between the Khedive and his Ministry being broken off.

On the 12th the French Government made the proposals that the two Powers should send ships of war to Alexandria, invite the Porte to abstain from interference, and ask the other Governments to do so likewise. The French Government considered that Tewfik Pasha should be supported, and added, not for communication to the

Porte:

"The French Government continue to be opposed to Turkish intervention, but they would not call intervention the case in which Turkish forces were summoned to Egypt by them, and operated there under their control, for an object, and on conditions which they should have themselves deter-

"If, after the arrival of their ships at Alexandria, the French Government should consider it advisable that troops should be landed, they would have recourse neither to English nor to French troops, but would call for Turkish troops on the conditions above specified."

Her Majesty's Government concurred; but Lord Granville told M. Tissot on the 15th that Mr. Gladstone and he regretted that the other Powers had not been invited to co-operate.

Lord Dufferin was instructed to tell the Sultan, with reference to his abstention from interference, that it was not improbable that further proposals would be made to the Porte later.

The President of the Chamber declared that it was impossible to change the Ministry as long as the military power continued to be vested in Arabi Pasha.

At the request of the Agents the Khedive restored the Ministry to office.

On the approach of the fleets, notwithstanding the orders of the Khedive, Arabi commenced military preparations. Lord Granville asked M. de Freycinet on the 19th whether there were still objections to speaking openly about the employment of Turkish troops. M. de Freycinet said that he regarded the employment of Turkish troops as a measure to be resorted to at the last extremity.

An identic telegram was sent to the Powers by England and France on the 21st May, stating that the object of the squadrons going to Alexandria was to secure the interests of Europe and maintain the Khedive under the Firmans. It was not

proposed to land troops or resort to a military occupation of the country.

The President of the Chamber having attempted to procure the withdrawal of Arabi Pasha and three other military Pashas from the country, Arabi Pasha declined to listen to the proposal.

On the 24th Lord Granville proposed to M. Tissot that the two Governments should telegraph a Circular to the Powers, asking them to join in asking the Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions.

On the 27th the French Government replied that there was nothing in the

situation which justified this.

The Khedive having accepted a formal proposal from the two Agents for the retirement of the Ministry and exile of Arabi Pasha, the Ministry resigned, and the Khedive in vain endeavoured to form another under Chérif Pasha.

On the 27th the officers of the regiments and police force stationed at Alexandria telegraphed to the Khedive that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi Pasha.

On the same day (May 27) Arabi Pasha met the chief persons of Cairo and the Deputies, and demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the recalcitrant; and, in consequence of a further representation from the Chiefs of religion that Arabi had threatened them with death if His Highness did not consent, the Khedive reinstated him, and he remained from this date, as Minister of War, the only Minister until Ragheb Pasha's Ministry was formed on the 16th June.

On the 29th Admiral Sir B. Seymour telegraphed that earthworks were being built rapidly abreast of Her Majesty's ship "Invincible." Much panic was reported


The Sultan was appealed to by Lord Dufferin, and orders were issued to suspend the construction of the earthworks.

An urgent appeal was made by the British residents at Alexandria for protection on the 30th May.

On the 30th the French and English Governments agreed in proposing the Conference on the following basis:—

"The maintenance of the rights of the Sovereign and of the Khedive; of international engagements, and the arrangement existing under them, whether with England and France alone or with those two nations and the other Powers; the preservation of the liberties secured by the Firmans of the Sultan; together with the prudent development of Egyptian institutions."

Foreign Office, June 30, 1882.



Appendix.

(A.)

Convention between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey. Signed July 15, 1840.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.

HIS Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United (Translation.) Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's throne,—their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the engagement which they contracted by the collective note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th July, 1839, and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan heve resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Arrangement in favour of Mehemet Ali.

Article I. His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of Convention. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Powers reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action Naval Assistance to Turkey by

which each may have at his disposal. Art. II. Measures to be adopted in case of Refusal by Mehemet Ali.

Art. III. Defence of Constantinople by Allied Powers against Mehemet Ali. Allied Forces to

Art. IV. Entrance of Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus for Defence of Constantinople exceptional. Rule prohibiting Foreign Ships of War to enter Dardanelles and Bosphorus to be maintained.

(Annex.) -- Extracts from Separate Act to the Convention of the 15th July, 1840.

His Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed:

Grant of Pashalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali and his Descendants. Administration of Southern Syria by Mehemet Ali during his Life. Title of Pasha of Acre.

§ 1. His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt.

§ 3. The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

Treaties and Laws of Ottoman Empire applicable to Egypt and Syria. Taxes and Imposts to be collected by Pasha of Egypt. Civil and Military Expenses to be defrayed by the Pasha.

\$ 5. All the Treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pashalic of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other

part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents that, on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces, the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood that, in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

Separate Act to form part of Convention of the 15th July, 1840.

§ 8. The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the Ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those of the said Convention.

[The remaining paragraphs relate to the Pashalic of Acre, the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Arabia and Candia, and other matters of only transitory importance.

À mon Vizir éclairé Tewfik Pacha, appelé au Khédiviat d'Égypte avec le haut rang de Tédaret effectif, décoré de mes Ordres Impériaux de l'Osmanié et du Medjidié en brillants, que le Tout-Puissant

perpétue sa splendeur, &c., &c.

Ismaïl Pacha, Khédive d'Égypte, ayant été relevé de ses fonctions ce Redjeb 1296, eu égard à tes services, à ta droiture, et à ta loyauté tant à ma personne qu'aux intérêts de mon Empire, à ton expérience des affaires d'Égypte, à ta capacité pour réformer la mauvaise situation dont ce pays souffre depuis quelque temps, et conformément à la règle établie par le Firman du 12 Mouharrem, 1283, pour la transmission du Khédiviat par ordre de primogéniture, de fils aîné en fils aîné, nous avons conféré à toi, en ta qualité de fils aîné d'Ismaïl Pacha, le Khédiviat d'Égypte, tel qu'il se trouve formé par ses anciennes limites et en y comprenant les territoires qui y ont été annexés.

L'accroissement de la prospérité de l'Égypte et la consolidation de la sécurité et de la tranquillité de ses habitants, constituant l'objet de notre plus haute sollicitude, nous avions rendu, il y a quelque temps, dans ce but, un Firman Impérial qui confirmait aussi les privilèges anciens de cette contrée. Cependant quelques-unes des dispositions du susdit Firman ayant donné lieu aux difficultés actuelles, en vue de confirmer ceux de ces privilèges qui doivent être maintenus intacts, et de corriger et améliorer ceux de ces privilèges qui ont paru nécessiter quelques modifications, nous avons fait insérer,

ci-après, les dispositions suivantes:

Tous les impôts de cette province seront perçus en mon nom. Les habitants d'Égypte étant de mes sujets, et ne devant comme tels subir la moindre oppression ni acte arbitraire, à cette condition le Khédiviat d'Égypte, auquel est confiée l'administration civile, financière, et judiciaire du pays, aura la faculté d'élaborer et d'établir, d'une manière conforme à la justice, tous règlements et lois intérieurs

nécessaires à cet égard.

Le Khédive sera autorisé à contracter et à renouveler, sans porter atteinte aux Traités politiques de mon Gouvernement Impérial, ni à ses droits souverains sur ce pays, les Conventions avec les Agents des Puissances Étrangères pour les Douanes et le commerce et pour toutes les transactions avec les étrangers concernant les affaires intérieures, et cela dans le but de développer le commerce, l'industrie, et l'agriculture, et de régler la police des étrangers et tous leurs rapports avec le Gouvernement et la population. Ces Conventions seront communiquées à ma Sublime Porte avant leur promulgation par le Khédive.

Le Khédive aura la disposition complète et entière des affaires financières du pays. Mais il n'aura pas le droit de contracter des emprunts, sauf pour ce qui concerne exclusivement le réglement de la situation financière présente, et en parfait accord avec ses présents créanciers ou les délégués chargés officiellement de leurs intérêts.

Le Khédiviat ne saura, sous aucun prétexte ni motif, abandonner à d'autres, en tout ou en partie, les privilèges accordés à l'Égypte et qui lui sont confiés, et qui sont une émanation de prérogatives inhérentes au pouvoir souverain, ni aucune partie du territoire.

L'Administration Égyptienne aura soin de payer régulièrement le tribut annuel, fixé à £ T. 750,000.

La monnaie sera frappée en Egypte en mon nom.

En temps de paix 18,000 hommes de troupes suffisent pour la garde intérieure de l'Égypte. Ce chiffre ne doit pas être dépassé. Cependant, comme les forces rgyptiennes de terre et de mer sont destinées aussi au service de mon Gouvernement, dans le cas où la Sublime Porte se trouverait engagée dans une guerre, leur chiffre pourra être augmenté dans la proportion jugée convenable.

Les drapeaux des forces de terre et de mer et les insignes des différents grades des officiers seront les mêmes que ceux de mes armées.

Le Khédiviat aura le droit de conférer aux officiers de terre et de mer jusqu'au grade de Colonel inclusivement et aux employés civils jusqu'au grade de Sanié inclusivement.

Le Khédive ne pourra, comme par le passé, construire des bâtiments blindés sans l'autorisation expresse de mon Gouvernement.

Je veillerai au strict maintien des conditions qui précèdent, et qui ayant été sanctionnées par mon Iradé Impérial, ont été consignées dans mon présent, orné de mon autographe Impérial, et qui te

The communication of the Firman to the Ambassadors was accompanied by an exchange of notes, explaining, on the part of the Porte, that the phrase "Ces Conventions seront communiquées à ma Sublime Porte avant leur promulgation par le Khédive," did not imply any obligation on the part of the Khedive to obtain the sanction or authorization of the Porte before promulgating or giving effect to non-political Conventions; and, to avoid all ambiguity in the sense of the passage, "Le Khédive ne saura sous aucun motif ni prétexte abandonner à d'autres en tout ou en partie les privilèges accordés à l'Egypte et qui lui sont confiés, comme une émanation des prérogatives inhérentes au pouvoir souverain, ni aucune partie du territoire," declaring that the Firman in no way restricted, except where specially mentioned, the rights, privileges, and prerogatives previously and personally accorded to the Khedive The ceremony of reading this Firman of Investiture took place at the Citadel of Cairo on the 14th

August.

"FO 881/4643: Egypt: Analysis. Egyptian Parliamentary Papers, Sept. 9, 1881, to May 31, 1882. With Summary of Events, 1840-1881, and Map. (Lord Tenterden)." The National Archives: Selected Maps Representing the Long 19th Century, Primary Source Media, 1882. Nineteenth Century Collections Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CGOGCC929316864/GDCS?u=loc_main&sid=GDCS&xid=373463f3&pg=1. Accessed 12 Feb. 2021.